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DEPICTION OF THE REGULATOR-REGULATED ENTITY
RELATIONSHIP IN THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY:
DETERRENCE-BASED VS. COOPERATIVE ENFORCEMENT
ROBERT

L. GLICKSMAN* AND

DIETRICH

H. EARNHART**

ABSTRACT

Foryears,scholarsand environmentalpolicymakers have conducted
a spiriteddebate about the comparative merits of two different approaches to enforcement of the nation's environmental laws: the coercive (or
deterrence-based)and cooperativeapproaches.Supportersof the coercive
model regardthe deterrence of violationsas the fundamental purpose of
enforcement. They regardthe imposition of sanctions, which make it less
costly for regulatedentities to comply with their regulatory responsibilities and avoid enforcement than to fail to comply and run the risk of
enforcement, as the most effective way for inducing regulated entities to
comply with their regulatory obligations.Proponents of the cooperative
approach to environmental enforcement focus more on compliance than
deterrence. The cooperative approach emphasizes the provision of compliance assistanceand incentives by regulatory agencies. They contend
that a coercive approachto enforcement may even be counterproductive
if it engenders intransigenceand ill will on the part of regulatedentities.
Few studies empirically test these competing theories about how
best to induce environmental compliance. Our study, which is based on
a survey of chemical manufacturingfacilities that are regulated under
the federal Clean Water Act ("CWA"), represents an effort to begin addressingthe paucity of informationon the effects of the two enforcement
approacheson environmental compliance and behavior.Although most
of the respondentsto our survey describe the relationshipsthey have with
theirCWA regulatorsasgenerallyeithercooperative orcoercive, they also
report that some particularaspects of their relationshipsare more consistent with one enforcement approach, while other aspects are more
* Robert W. Wagstaff Professor of Law, University of Kansas. Professor Glicksman
thanks Erica Dew, University of Kansas School of Law, Class of 2003, for her valuable
research assistance.
**Associate Professor, Economics, University of Kansas. Professor Earnhart thanks
Dylan Rassier for his valuable research assistance.
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consistent with the other enforcementapproach.Our study calculatesand
interprets the correlations between all of the various aspects of the
regulator-regulatedentity relationship, especially the overall type of
relationship:coercive versus cooperative. The results reveal only weak
correlationbetween the variousmeasurescapturingthe relationshipbetween
the regulatorand the regulatedentity. Cross-tabulationof the responses
to allpossible pairs of relationshipaspects also reveals less than complete
overlap between the various measures capturingthe relationshipbetween
the regulatorand the regulatedentity. We conclude that the relationship
between a regulator and a regulated entity consists of multiple dimensions. Environmental scholars and policymakers should recognize the
nuanced nature of these relationshipsif they are to provide the most
meaningful contributions to the ongoing debate over the impacts of
coercive and cooperative enforcement approaches on the behavior and
performance of regulated entities.
INTRODUCTIONt

According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "[e] nvironmental laws and regulations are designed to protect human health and
safeguard the environment. But they can achieve their purpose only
when companies and facilities comply with requirements."' Assuring
*The research described in this Article was conducted as part of a larger project financed

by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") pursuant to STAR Research
Assistance Agreement No. R-82882801-0. A copy of the final report delivered to EPA
under that Agreement, U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, SHAPING CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL
BEHAVIOR AND PERFORMANCE: THE IMPACT OF ENFORCEMENT AND NON-ENFORCEMENT

TOOLS (2006), as well as an Executive Summary of the report, can be found at http://www
.ku.edu/pri/CEP/EPA/. This Article has not been formally reviewed by EPA. The views
expressed in this Article are solely those of Robert Glicksman and Dietrich Earnhart. EPA
does not endorse any products or commercial services mentioned in this manuscript. The
authors thank Donald Haider-Markel, Associate Professor of Political Science, Policy
Research Institute, University of Kansas, and Tatsui Ebihara, Senior Engineer at LFR
Levine Fricke (formerly at the University of Kansas, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering), for their participation in the EPA STAR grant research project. The
authors also thank Chris Drahozal, Joel Mintz, and Cliff Rechtschaffen for their very
helpful comments on drafts of this Article.
'U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,, 2003-2008 STRATEGIC PLAN 111 (2003). See also David L.
Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a "Reinvented" State/Federal
Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2000)
[hereinafter Markell, Deterrence-BasedEnforcement] (reporting the view of EPA's Deputy
Assistant Administrator of the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance that
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compliance with environmental statutes, regulations, and permit
provisions by individual regulated entities is therefore "a key operational
goal of EPA and state environmental agencies." 2 Unless regulated entities comply with the obligations imposed on them by the environmental
laws, or are forced to answer for noncompliance, those laws will represent an impressive-looking edifice that in reality is little more than an
empty lot fronted by a flimsy facade.
The question of how best to improve compliance rates by regulated entities, however, is not easily answered. As a group of researchers
studying environmental compliance has put it, "[clompliance assurance
is... among the most contentious issues in the post-2000 EPA policy
agenda."3 One component of any credible effort to assure regulatory compliance is a strong governmental enforcement presence. 4 As Professor
David Markell, an expert on environmental enforcement, has indicated,
"EPA has long held, and continues to hold, the view that traditional,
deterrence-based enforcement is an essential element of an effective environmental regulatory scheme."' Professor Joel Mintz, another expert
on environmental enforcement, posits that "[e]nforcement is critical both
as a control on firms and individuals who violate environmental standards
and as a defense of the legitimacy of the governmental intervention that
sustains voluntary compliance."6

"theimportance of an effective compliance effort to the productive functioning of our
regulatory system is difficult to overstate").
environmental
2
Mark Stoughton et al., TowardIntegratedApproaches to ComplianceAssurance, 31 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 11,266, at 11,266 (2001).
3 Id. See also ROBERT L. GLIcKsMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY
1000 (4th ed. 2003) (describing "increasing debate about 'what works best' in promoting
compliance with environmental requirements").
'See infra notes 33-53 and accompanying text.
' Markell, Deterrence-BasedEnforcement, supra note 1, at 10. See also David Markell,
"Slack" in the Administrative State and its Implications for Governance: The Issue of
Accountability, 84 OR. L. REv. 1, 22 (2005) [hereinafter Markell, Slack in the Administrative
State] ('Traditionally, compliance has been nearly synonymous with enforcement.")(quoting
ENVTL. L. INST. ETAL., BEYOND ENFORCEMENT?: ENFORCEMENT, COMPLIANCE ASSISTANCE,
AND CORPORATE LEADERSHIP PROGRAMS IN FIvE MIDWEST STATES 2 (2003)).
6 JOEL A. MINTz, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD CHOICES 2 (1995).

See also Clifford Rechtschaffen, PromotingPragmaticRisk Regulation:Is Enforcement
Discretionthe Answer?, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1327, 1361 (2004) [hereinafter Rechtschaffen,
PragmaticRisk Regulation] (contending that "enforcement resonates so strongly with the
public because it is central to the legitimacy of the law. Enforcement is perceived as fundamental to the orderly working of the legal regime.").
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Congress has made an array of tools available to EPA to assist it
in enforcing the federal pollution control laws.7 These tools include the
authority to require regulated entities to keep records and submit reports
to EPA8 and the right to inspect regulated facilities to gather information
that may assist the agency in enforcement actions.9 If the government
believes that noncompliance is occurring, it may initiate enforcement
action, either through administrative proceedings or in court, in which it
may seek to enjoin future noncompliance, impose civil or criminal penalties, or both.' ° State environmental agencies typically have the same
kinds of tools at their disposal."
At the same time, some research on environmental enforcement
has discerned "broad agreement at the federal and state levels that the
traditional, exclusive reliance on penalty-based enforcement approaches
to compliance assurance is inadequate." 2 That premise fueled a shift in
emphasis during the 1990s by both federal and state environmental agencies to "a more partnership-focused, less adversarial approach" that uses
"multiple tools to advance compliance assurance."" EPA, for example, concluded that a penalty-based approach is reactive rather than proactive
and is incomplete because it fails to reward voluntary compliance. 4 Regulated entities and state officials joined in "sound[ing] the theme that an
approach based on cooperation is more likely to produce compliance in
many cases than an approach based on deterrence." 5 During the 1990s,
EPA responded to these calls for greater cooperation between the agency
and regulated entities by adopting enforcement policies designed to provide a more flexible approach to inducing compliance with regulatory
obligations by offering "compliance incentive [s]" and "compliance assistance" to regulated facilities. 6 The results of EPA's response are evident.

'See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (2007); 42 U.S.C. § 7414 (2007).
' See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(1).
' See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a); 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(2).
10 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319; 42 U.S.C. § 7413.
11See GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 950-52.
12 Stoughton et al., supra note 2, at 11,266.
13 Id.

1"Markell, Slack in the Administrative State, supra note 5, at 52-53 (citing Michael M.
Stahl, Enforcement in Transition,ENVTL. FORUM, Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 19).
15 GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 1000.
16
Markell,Deterrence-BasedEnforcement, supra note 1, at 14. Professor William Andreen
explains the shift as follows:
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Before the adoption of this new flexible approach, an environmental enforcement expert wrote that "it seems most accurate to describe EPA's
enforcement practices as constituting, in the main, a deterrence system."'
Today, EPA describes its "enforcement efforts [as] focus [ed] on assisting
businesses and communities with compliance training and guidance.""
Similarly, "many states have actually, to one extent or another, replaced traditional enforcement mechanisms with some form of cooperationbased strategy." 9 One explanation of this shift is the states' desire to

In the early 1990s, EPA began to recognize a more explicit role for a
cooperation-based approach to compliance. In doing so, EPA expanded
its ability to provide compliance assistance to regulated entities. This
has involved such things as workshops, seminars, on-site assistance,
compliance guides, as well as the development of ten internet-based
compliance assistance centers and the launch of a compliance assistance
clearinghouse. At about the same time, EPA began to initiate a number
of compliance incentive programs designed to encourage dischargers to
self-audit their facilities and correct violations before they are discovered
by government inspectors.
William L. Andreen, MotivatingEnforcement: InstitutionalCulture and the Clean Water
Act, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007). See also Rechtschaffen, PragmaticRisk
Regulation, supra note 6, at 1332 (discussing EPA's placement, beginning in the mid1990s, of "greater emphasis on compliance assistance and compliance incentive methods
and on integrating these tools with traditional enforcement methods," including, in addition
to the techniques referred to by Andreen, 'compliance assistance tools" such as sector notebooks, hotlines, audit protocols, and checklists, and compliance incentives tools such as
a policy to encourage compliance by small business); Markell, Slack in the Administrative
State,supranote 5, at 53-54. "EPA defines compliance incentive policies as those policies
that 'encourage regulated entities to voluntarily discover, disclose and correct violations
or clean up contaminated sites before they are identified by the government for enforcement investigation or response,'" while it defines compliance assistance as consisting of
"information and technical assistance provided to the regulated community to help it meet
the requirements of environmental law." Markell, Deterrence-BasedEnforcement, supra
note 1, at 14 nn.46-47 (quoting U.S. ENVTL. PROT.AGENCY, OPERATING PRINCIPLES FOR
AN INTEGRATED EPA ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE PROGRAM 8-9

(1996)).

Compliance assistance includes "outreach," "response to requests for assistance," and
"on-site assistance." Id. at 14 n.47.
17MINTZ, supra note 6, at 103.
8
Environmental Protection Agency, Compliance and Enforcement, http://www.epa.gov/
ebtpages/complianceenforcement.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2007).
1
Andreen, supranote 16. See also Markell, Slack in the AdministrativeState, supra note
5, at 22 (concluding that the states have surpassed the EPA in shifting from deterrencebased enforcement to an "'integrated compliance program' in which deterrence-based
enforcement is only one piece in a large tool box of compliance-promotion approaches").
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retain and attract business by holding out the promise of less rigorous,
or at least less confrontational, enforcement. °
A cooperative relationship is one in which government regulators
provide flexibility to regulated facilities, including the provision of a
variety of forms of compliance assistance.2 1 This assistance is designed
to induce facilities to address noncompliance pro-actively.2 2 Within the
coercive approach, regulators deter facilities
from noncompliance by
23
imposing sanctions without flexibility.
For all the debate that the recent emphasis on cooperative approaches to assuring compliance with the environmental laws has engendered, relatively little empirical research has been directed at a comparison of the traditional, deterrence-based (or coercive) enforcement
approach and the cooperative enforcement approach to inducing compliance with environmental regulatory obligations. 4 This Article is designed

20

See, e.g., Richard Webster, Federal Environmental Enforcement: Is Less More?, 18

FoRDHAm ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (claiming that "[a]necdotal evidence suggests
that states have moved away from deterrence-based enforcement towards compliance
assistance because they want to be more attractive to new business and encourage existing
businesses to stay or grow"). But see id. at 6 (describing "suspicion among environmental
groups that these [cooperative enforcement] initiatives merely provide cover for decreasing de facto environmental standards through enforcement"). More generally, Professor
Andreen asserts that "[e]nforcement... is an attractive target, due to its obscurity for
an administration or a Congress intent on undermining an Act with which it fundamentally disagrees." Andreen, supra note 16. Administrative law scholars have suggested
that " [a s regulators' discretion increases, so does the potential for special interest groups
to influence agency policy." Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: FlexibleRegulation and
Constraintson Agency Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 459 (1999). That assessment
may explain why regulated entities may prefer a cooperative to a coercive relationship
with their regulators, given the greater flexibility that tends to inhere in the cooperative
model of environmental enforcement. For a description of the manner in which the cooperative model differs from the coercive model of enforcement, see infra Part I.A.2.
21
See infra Part I.A.2.
22
See infra Part I.A.2.
23
See infra Part I.A.1.
24
See infra Part I.B.
At present the data available allow little to be said about the effect of
diverting resources from deterrence-based enforcement to compliance
assistance. There is good evidence that traditional deterrence-based
enforcement encourages compliance. However, there is no systematic
study of whether compliance assistance achieves success at individual
facilities at the expense of overall compliance rates, as deterrence theory
would suggest. Thus, to date, the states' shift to compliance assistance
has been more of an act of faith than a rational policy choice.
Webster, supra note 20, at 8.
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to provide some insight into how regulated entities perceive the nature
of their relationships with environmental regulators. In particular, the
Article reports on a survey that we conducted, in collaboration with two
other researchers,2 5 of facilities in the chemical industry that are regulated under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit
("NPDES") program established by the federal Clean Water Act ("CWA"). 26
The Article addresses whether the individual respondents working at
those facilities characterize the facilities' relationships with CWA regulators as coercive or cooperative in nature by analyzing responses to a
series of questions that relate to different aspects of the relationship between CWA regulators and regulated facilities.
Despite the dichotomy between coercive and cooperative approaches
to inducing compliance with the environmental laws, it is clear that federal and state agencies rarely rely exclusively on one approach.2 7 As
Professor Clifford Rechtschaffen recently stated:
While [the] distinctions [between coercive and cooperative
approaches to enforcement] are significant and influence
the enforcement policies of states and the federal government, it is also true that in practice, most environmental
enforcement systems are a pragmatic combination of the
two approaches. This is true to an even greater extent now
as a result of recent reforms adopted by the EPA.
Numerous studies of agency enforcement demonstrate that most enforcers use a flexible, hybrid strategy
that includes elements of both coercion and cooperation;
few rigidly adhere to legalistic procedures.2"
A hybrid approach to improving compliance rates might be composed, for
example, of "an offer of compliance assistance to a particular regulated
sector with a public threat of increased inspections."2 9
The other researchers associated with the survey are Don Haider-Markel, a political
scientist at the University of Kansas and director of a survey center, and Tat Ebihara, a
wastewater engineer with LFR Levine Fricke and formerly a professor at the University
of Kansas.
2 Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 33(c), 91 Stat. 1566, 1577 (1977) (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2007)).
25

27 Rechtschaffen, PragmaticRisk Regulation, supra note 6, at 1330.
8Id.
2

Id. at 1333.
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Given the broad discretion that statutes such as the CWA and
state environmental laws typically vest in federal and state regulators,
the agencies have a considerable range of choices at their disposal in deciding which mix of traditional, coercive enforcement techniques and
cooperative ventures to apply in particular instances of known or suspected noncompliance.30 Insights into how regulated entities perceive the
nature oftheir relationships with environmental regulators should facilitate future research into how regulated entities are expected to react under
each type of relationship. In turn, these insights should assist environmental regulators in devising the mix of enforcement approaches most
apt to result in desirable levels of compliance by regulated industries.
Part I of this Article summarizes the theoretical debate over the
advantages and disadvantages of both coercive and cooperative approaches to enforcement. It also describes the few empirical studies that
directly compare the two approaches in the context of environmental
regulation. Part II describes both the methods we used in administering
our survey to facilities in the chemical industry regulated under the
NPDES permit program, and the results from our analysis of the survey
responses. Our analysis of the survey responses reveals that most of the
participants in our survey report that they have cooperative relationships
with their CWA regulators. A closer look at their responses to a series of
questions designed to elicit responses to various aspects of the regulatorregulated entity relationship, however, reveals that the relationship is
unlikely to be distinctively either cooperative or coercive. Instead, the
respondents in our survey of the chemical industry report that some
components of their relationships are cooperative in nature, while others
are coercive.
This conclusion has significant implications both in analyzing previous empirical studies on the effectiveness of coercive and cooperative
approaches to enforcement and compliance and in designing and conducting future studies of this kind. Our conclusion that the relationship
between an environmental regulator and a regulated entity consists of
multiple dimensions suggests that, before assessing the effect of this relationship on environmental behavior and/or performance on the part of

30

See, e.g., id. at 1334 ("[Flew areas of the law invest more discretion in agency employees

or are more hidden from the public's view and oversight than an agency's enforcement
actions.") (quoting Robert R. Kuehn, Remedying the UnequalEnforcement ofEnvironmental
Laws, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 625, 640 (1994)).
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regulated entities, future researchers should measure the various characteristics of the relationship rather than treat it in simplistic fashion as
a monolithic reflection of one or the other approach to enforcement. Our
survey questions reflect one attempt to describe the multifaceted nature
of the relationship between the regulator and the regulated entity. Future
research efforts should build on and refine these initial efforts to provide
a more accurate portrayal of the impacts of coercive and cooperative
approaches to environmental enforcement and compliance.
I.

COERCIVE AND COOPERATIVE APPROACHES TO ENFORCEMENT IN
CONTEXT: THEORY AND PRACTICE

A.

The Theoretical Debate

The literature on environmental enforcement distinguishes between the coercive, or deterrence-based, and cooperative approaches to
enforcement. 3' A review of the legal, political science, and economics literature on environmental enforcement reveals a debate about the comparative efficacy of these two different models.32 We describe each of
these approaches, and summarize the arguments that have been made
in favor of and against reliance on each approach.
1.

The Coercive, or Deterrence-Based, Approach

The coercive or deterrence model "reflects the view that policing
and deterring violations are the essential core of environmental agencies'
activities and that other compliance activities are either (1) secondary
and dispensable or (2) second-best compromises made to accommodate
the realities of limited resources."3 3 In its efforts to implement this approach, EPA traditionally "sought to identify significant violators and
then pursued such violators through formal enforcement actions that
sought to penalize the violators by imposing sanctions that exceeded the
economic benefit the violators reaped through non-compliance, while also
requiring a timely return to compliance."3 4 As Professor Markell explains,
31

See, e.g., CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAvID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL

ENFORCEMENT AND THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 59 (2003).
32

See id.

3'Markell, Slack in the Administrative State, supra note 5, at 22 (quoting ENVTL. L. INST.
ETAL., supra note 5, at 2).
34 Id. at 47.
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"I[k] ey elements of this model included: (1) monitoring compliance by the
regulated community; (2) identifying violations; and (3) pursuing timely
and appropriate enforcement actions against significant violators."3 5
The coercive model is premised on the idea that regulated entities
are rational economic actors whose principal motivations include maximization of profits.3 6 According to one recent account:
Two visions of the firm dominate the compliance literature. The first is the firm as a rational profit-maximizer,
obeying the law only when it is in the firm's best economic
interest to do so. Thus, violations occur when the perceived
benefits of noncompliance exceed the anticipated cost of
sanctions. This view of the firm is consistent with deterrence theory, which regulators have historically relied upon
in developing their enforcement programs. The rational
profit-maximizer view typically leads to the use of traditional enforcement techniques; namely, extensive government monitoring and inspections coupled with penalties
for observed violations.3 7
The deterrence model therefore postulates that decisions regarding compliance are based on self-interest; businesses comply when the costs of
noncompliance outweigh the benefits of noncompliance. 31 Companies can
35 Id. at 49.
36

Id. at 51. Although the CWA regulates facilities that discharge pollutants into surface

bodies of water (referred to as point sources, defined in 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2007)),
individuals or groups of individuals make decisions that ultimately result in a facility's
compliance or noncompliance. The CWA subjects those who engage in certain kinds of
violations to criminal penalties. 33 U.S.C § 1319(c) (2007). Accordingly, a rational individual would also take into account as part of his or her decisionmaking process the
potential personal consequences of decisions that bear on compliance, including the
of incarceration.
possibility
37
Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation, Complianceand the Firm,76 TEMP. L. REV. 451,453-54
(2003). See also David B. Spence, Can the Second Generation Learn from the First?
Understandingthe Politics of Regulatory Reform, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 205, 207 (2001)
(stating that regulatory systems based on the deterrence model proceed on the premise,
"consistent with the rational actor model of the firm, that compliance decisions were
based on an expected value calculation. Firms would tend to comply with environmental
regulations if the expected value of doing so was positive").
3 Professor Michael Vandenbergh has stated that:
[TIhe standard economic deterrence model has applied a rational choice
analysis to environmental compliance decision-making. Common formulations of the standard deterrence model assume that an individual
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save money by not purchasing, installing, and operating pollution control
equipment and can avoid additional training for workers by failing to
comply with environmental regulations.3 9 "The costs of noncompliance
include the costs [sic] of coming into compliance once a violation is detected" as compared to coming into compliance earlier, "plus any penalties imposed for being found in violation multiplied (discounted) by the
probability that the violations will be detected."4" These costs can also
include damage to the business's reputation,4 ' potential tort liability,4 2
and legal system expenses.43
The deterrence model proceeds on the premise that increasing the
certainty and severity of penalties will deter noncompliance." Under this
model, a facility's compliance status depends on the likelihood that violations will be detected by those entitled to enforce regulatory obligations4 5
and the severity of the sanctions that noncompliance may trigger, because
regulated entities will comply with their legal obligations only when they

will seek to maximize expected utility and thus will comply with an environmental law when the costs of noncompliance exceed the benefits.
The costs of noncompliance are assumed to be the product of the certainty and severity of formal legal sanctions. Following this approach,
individuals are not motivated to comply absent the threat of formal
legal sanctions.
Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of Social Norms in
CorporateEnvironmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55,63-64 (2003) [hereinafter
Vandenbergh,
Beyond Elegance].
39
RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 31, at 60.
40

41

/d.

See generallyJonathan M. Karpoffet al., The ReputationalPenaltiesfor Environmental
Violations: EmpiricalEvidence, 48 J.L. & ECON. 653 (2005).
42 See Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, ModularEnvironmentalRegulation, 54 DUKE
L.J. 795, 830 n.100 (2005) (asserting that "[flirms might also be motivated [to comply with
environmental regulations] by a desire to avoid the potential for future tort liability");
Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life ofPublic Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029,2059
(2005) (arguing that the incentives to comply with environmental laws may derive from
a variety of factors, including tort liability). But see Freeman & Farber, supra, at 832
(claiming that "although firms may try to control their environmental impact to avoid
tort liability or to reap the public relations benefits of being perceived as 'green,' these
incentives may not be enough to ensure compliance").
4 See RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 31, at 60.
4"See Mark A. Cohen, Empirical Research on the Deterrent Effect of Environmental
Monitoringand Enforcement, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,245, at 10,245 (2000)
[hereinafter Cohen, EmpiricalResearch].
41Under the CWA, both the government and private citizens (including environmental
public interest groups) are authorized to initiate enforcement actions. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319,
1365 (2007). This Article does not address the role of citizen enforcement.
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are convinced that the government might detect and penalize noncompliance.4 s The essential task for enforcement agencies, therefore, is to make
penalties high enough and the probability of detection great enough that
it becomes economically irrational for regulated entities to violate the
law.47 It is also necessary for regulated entities to perceive that there is
a significant likelihood that the government will bring an enforcement
action when a violation is detected.' In 1992, EPA described the four key
elements of an effective enforcement program as follows: "(1) There is a
good chance violations will be detected; (2) The response to violations will
be swift and predictable; (3) The response will include an appropriate
to requirements perceive that the first
sanction; and (4) Those subject
49
three factors are present."

4 Robert A. Kagan et al., Explaining CorporateEnvironmentalPerformance:How Does
RegulationMatter?, 37 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 51,61 (2005). Incentives will not operate in the
same fashion for all regulated facilities. The benefits of noncompliance may be greater,
for example, for a facility with high control costs than for a facility with low control costs.
Thus, even if the likelihood of detection and the severity of the sanction are equal for both,
it may be more "rational" for the facility with the higher avoided costs of compliance to
decide not to take the steps necessary to come into compliance.
17 As one expert on environmental enforcement and compliance explains:
Economists who study firm compliance and deterrence invariably start
with the "optimal penalty" model of Gary Becker. The basic insight of
that seminal article is that potential offenders respond to both the probability of detection and the severity of punishment if detected and convicted. Thus, deterrence may be enhanced either by raising the penalty,
by increasing monitoring activities to raise the likelihood that the offender will be caught, or by changing legal rules to increase the probability of conviction. Becker's model ultimately leads to an "efficient"
level of crime, whereby the marginal cost of enforcement is equated to
the marginal social benefit of crime reduction.
Cohen, EmpiricalResearch, supra note 44, at 10,245 (citing Gary S. Becker, Crime and
Punishment:An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968)). Cohen has also characterized Becker's "seminal" article as "the starting point for virtually all subsequent
economic analyses of crime and punishment." Mark A. Cohen, EnvironmentalCrime and
Punishment:Legal /Economic Theory andEmpiricalEvidence on Enforcement ofFederal
Environmental Statutes, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1054, 1063 (1992). Moreover,
according to Cohen, "[m]odels of 'optimal' enforcement and penalties generally do not
distinguish between civil and criminal remedies, since both impose costs on the offender
that will be internalized into its decision calculus."Id. Accordingly, the same considerations
that govern decisions bearing on potential civil liability also may affect decisions bearing
on the risk that the facility will be subjected to criminal fines.
"
See Markell, Slack in the Administrative State, supra note 5, at 49.
49
1Id. at 50 (quotingU.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PRINCIPLES OF ENvIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT

2-3 (1992)).
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Under an enforcement approach based on the deterrence model, °
an inspection of a facility subject to environmental regulation may be conducted in an effort to detect violations and collect evidence for subsequent
enforcement actions, not to provide compliance advice to the inspected
entity.5 Because increasing the incidence of government monitoring tends
to be expensive, the proponents of the deterrence model often argue that
the best way to increase the effectiveness of enforcement of environmental laws as a deterrent to noncompliance is to increase the likelihood
of conviction or the severity of the sanction. 2 Supporters of the coercive
approach claim that:
[Dieterrence-based enforcement activity has provided a
strong source of motivation for regulated entities. Fear of
enforcement action and its attendant public embarrassment has caused many companies and facilities to move

o Deterrence theory distinguishes between specific deterrence and general deterrence,
though the distinction also applies to a cooperative enforcement approach. See Cohen,
EmpiricalResearch, supranote 44, at 10,246. "Specificdeterrence refers to the effect that
an inspection or enforcement activity targeting a particular firm has on that firm's subsequent environmental performance." Id. See also Markell, Slack in the Administrative
State, supra note 5, at 51 (defining the goal of specific deterrence as ensuring that "the
specific violator pursued through an enforcement action will learn its lesson and not
violate again"). General deterrence captures corporate responses to the underlying threat
of receiving a government intervention. Cohen, EmpiricalResearch, supra note 44, at
10,246 (stating that "[gleneral deterrence refers to the effect of an enforcement activity
on the behavior of a large number of persons or firms"); Markell, Slack in the Administrative State, supranote 5, at 51 (describing the goal of general deterrence as ensuring that
"other regulated parties will take heed of the government's enforcement presence and
activity and will be more likely to comply with their legal obligations as a result"). It involves "deterring the broader regulated community from noncompliance." RECHTSCHAFFEN
& MARKELL, supra note 31, at 60-61. The preceding literature focuses almost exclusively
on general deterrence. See generallyCohen, EmpiricalResearch, supra note 44; Markell,
Slack in the Administrative State, supra note 5. Consistent with this focus, we also
consider only general deterrence.
" The federal government may pursue enforcement action under the CWA without having
conducted a prior inspection. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1) (2007) (giving EPA the
authority to pursue administrative enforcement"on the basis ofany information available"
to it)(emphasis added). If a report that is submitted by a polluting facility to its regulator
demonstrates on its face that its pollution levels have exceeded the levels authorized in
its NPDES permit, an inspection is not necessary to provide evidence of noncompliance.
See Ann Powers, Reducing NitrogenPollutionon Long IslandSound: Is There a Placefor
Pollutant
Trading?,23 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 137, 182-83 (1998).
52
See, e.g., Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance, supra note 38, at 64-65.
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into compliance. Deterrence has prevented many noncomplying parties from gaining an unfair competitive advantage over those who comply. And it has helped drive the
application of technologies that can improve business
performance and profitability.5 3
2.

The Cooperative Approach

An alternative model of environmental enforcement is the cooperative model. This model is a "reaction to the adversarial enforcement
methods suggested by the deterrence model."5 4 The cooperative model
emphasizes compliance, not the deterrence of noncompliance.5 5 Accordingly, the primary function of an inspection may not be, as it is under the
deterrence model, to accumulate evidence of violations for subsequent
enforcement actions, but rather to provide advice to regulated entities as
a means of facilitating compliance.5 6 Under this approach, an inspection
serves largely as an opportunity to resolve problems.5 7 Cooperative enforcement approaches have been described as an example of "negotiate
and control," as compared with the traditional "command and control"
environmental regulatory regime with which coercive enforcement has
traditionally been associated.5"
Under both the coercive and cooperative models, facility inspections 9 and enforcement actions serve as threats.6 ° Under the coercive
model, the general deterrent effect of an inspection or an enforcement
action of one facility derives exclusively from the threat it creates for

5 Markell, Slack in the Administrative State, supra note 5, at 52.
Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance, supra note 38, at 60.
55
See id. at 116-17 (discussing problems with the cooperative model and noncompliance).
56 RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 31, at 70.
17 Id. Professor Rechtschaffen describes the kind of compromise that may result:
In one... initiative directed at steel "minimills," one EPA regional office
announced that facilities would have six months within which to conduct
self-audits and disclose violations under EPA's self-audit/disclosure
policy. After those six months, multimedia inspection teams would inspect all nonauditing facilities and take appropriate enforcement action.
Rechtschaffen, PragmaticRisk Regulation, supra note 6, at 1333.
58
Markell, Slack in the Administrative State, supra note 5, at 56 (quoting David A. Dana,
The New "Contractarian"
Paradigmin EnvironmentalRegulation, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV.
35,
37
(2000)).
5
9See, e.g., RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 31, at 233.
60
Id. at 59.
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other facilities that may be the subject of similar actions in the future.6 '
Under the cooperative model of enforcement, however, regulated facilities
may be afforded more opportunities to avoid sanctions by resolving noncompliance before a penalty is assessed or other enforcement action pursued.6 2 A cooperative regulator might even withdraw a pending sanction
for past noncompliance once compliance has been achieved." Such a regulator may choose to refrain from sanctioning a facility that has violated
its NPDES permit as a result of a cooperative history between the regulator and the facility.' As a result, the cooperative approach "emphasizes
flexible or selective enforcement that takes into consideration the particular circumstances of an observed violation." 5 Indeed, "[11evying penalties
is seen as a mark of the [cooperative] system's failure (to otherwise obtain
compliance); compliance systems rely far more on rewards and incentives
than penalties."66
A cooperation-based system of enforcement views corporations
not as economic actors solely interested in maximizing profits, but as institutions "influenced by a mix of civic and social motives."6 7 This model
postulates that corporations are generally "inclined to comply with the
law" (although developing accurate measurements of such inclinations is
problematic).6" According to some analysts of environmental regulation,
corporations "have internalized the general societal norms about environmental protection."6 9 If businesses are generally committed to compliance
with their regulatory obligations even without a coercive enforcement presence, the imposition of sanctions in the event that noncompliance occurs
is not only unnecessary, but may even be counterproductive. ° A "sanctionoriented" response to noncompliance may make regulated entities "resentful" and less likely to cooperate with regulators in the future.7 Such
61

Id. at60.

62

See id. at 70.

6

See id.

64
65

See id.

John T. Scholz, Cooperation,Deterrence, and the Ecology of Regulatory Enforcement,

18 LAw & Soc'y REV. 179, 180 (1984).
66

Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrencevs. Cooperationand the Evolving Theory ofEnviron-

mental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1188 (1998) [hereinafter Rechtschaffen,
Deterrence
vs. Cooperation].
67
Id. at 1191.
68 id.

& MARKELL, supra note 31, at 215.
Id.at 67-68.
71 Id. at 68. See also Raymond J. Burby & Robert G. Paterson, Improving Compliance
with State Environmental Regulations,12 J. OF POL'YANALYsIs & MGMT. 753, 756 (1993)
69 RECHTSCHAFFEN
70
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a shift in attitude may matter to regulators if it increases the intransigence of regulated facilities, thereby increasing the cost ofmonitoring compliance and pursuing noncompliance.7 2 Although the presence of clear and
well-understood regulatory obligations (such as the effluent limitations
contained in NPDES permits) 3 may reduce the incidence of overcompliance, facilities regulated under the CWA may still choose to overcomply
as a means of avoiding noncompliance that results from random variations
in plant operations or unexpected events that may occasionally push a
plant into noncompliance. A coercive response to these types of noncompliance events may breed especially strong resentment or ill will.74
The environmental enforcement literature that supports the cooperative model of enforcement therefore tends to urge that regulators treat
regulated entities found to be in noncompliance as "partners."7 5 Regulated
entities afforded such a regulatory reception, so the argument goes, will
tend to respond more positively to suggestions and advice tendered by

(arguing that "the overzealous use of deterrence can foster resentment and retaliation,
leading regulated groups to apply political pressure to reduce enforcement or repeal the
offending regulatory program"). Perhaps this willingness to apply political pressure on
the part of regulated entities represents the most important weakness of a coercive enforcement approach. Our survey of chemical manufacturing facilities inquires whether or
not the regulated entities had asked an elected official to help with a difference of opinion
between the facility and the regulator in the preceding three-year period. Five percent
of the sampled facilities had requested this assistance. In addition, nineteen percent of
the sampled facilities had asked the supervisor of the facility's water regulator to help with
a difference of opinion between the facility and the regulator.
72 See Sidney A. Shapiro & Randy S. Rabinowitz, Punishment Versus Cooperation in
Regulatory Enforcement: A Case Study of OSHA, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 713, 718-19 (1997)
(claiming that, if the government imposes sanctions despite the belief of environmental
managers that they have made good faith efforts to comply with regulations, "corporate
officers may react by being less cooperative with regulatory agencies," such as by refusing
to identify new problems for regulators or contesting enforcement actions even if the firm's
legal costs will exceed the size of the fine); see also Kagan et al., supra note 46, at 61-62
(noting that some theorists claim that"a uniformly aggressive style of regulation is likely
to engender legalistic and political resistance"). A risk exists "that too much deterrence will
have the effect of stifling other socially desirable activities. Unlike street crime that has
no social utility, most environmental offenses are byproducts of socially desirable production or distribution processes." Cohen, EmpiricalResearch, supra note 44, at 10,251.
Of course, this risk of over-deterrence applies to both enforcement approaches, coercive
and cooperative. However, the risk is greater within a coercive approach. See id.
73The effluent limitations contained in NPDES Permits are often expressed as numerical
limits on discharge allowed from individual units of production. See GLICKSMAN ET AL.,
supra note 3, at 543.
14RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 31, at 67-68.
75Id.
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regulators on how to achieve compliance than will entities saddled with
a coercive enforcement presence.76 Such a "partnership" should involve
the use of flexible guidelines rather than uniform rules, and an emphasis on before-the-fact prevention of violations instead of after-the-fact
sanctions for noncompliance. 7
Independent of the incentives for compliance provided by any enforcement approach, voluntary compliance may comport with a regulated
entity's self-interest due to market forces.78 Compliance may result in cost
savings for regulated entities because steps taken to assure compliance
may also produce more efficient business operations by reducing waste
management costs, reducing raw material acquisition costs, lowering
energy costs, reducing insurance premiums in response to good compliance history, reducing the costs of borrowing if lenders regard those who
comply as less risky investments, and reducing the likelihood of tort
judgments or other third party liabilities. 9 In addition, compliance may
allow a firm to market itself as "green," affording it competitive advantages. o Finally, a good environmental performance record can attract
capital from investors seeking to pour their money into "socially responsible" businesses.8" It is possible that these extra-regulatory factors provide a sufficient impetus for compliant behavior and that no regulatory
presence is necessary, or at least that regulatory enforcement does not
provide a payoff in terms of incremental improvements in compliance
that justify the cost of its implementation. 2 If an enforcement strategy
76Id.

77

See Raymond J. Burby, Coercive v. CooperativePollution Control: ComparativeStudy
of State Programsto Reduce Erosion and Sedimentation Pollution in UrbanAreas, 19
ENVTL. MGMT. 359, 361 (1995).
78 RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 31, at 218.
79
Id. at 218-20.
80
Id. at 219.
81 Id. at 220.
2Both coercive

and cooperative approaches to enforcement require regulators to invest
in monitoring and enforcement. It is possible that these costs will be greater under a coercive approach because regulators feel the need for more frequent inspections due to the
lack of cooperation between regulators and regulated facilities, and because enforcement
action tends to be more frequent under a coercive approach. See Burby, supra note 77,
at 360. On the other hand, the technical assistance that regulators provide on an ongoing
basis under a cooperative enforcement regime may be even more costly than the costs of
monitoring and enforcement incurred by coercive regulators. See Douglas C. Michael,
CooperativeImplementationof FederalRegulations, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 535, 543 (1996)
(arguing that one of the prerequisites to a successful enforcement approach based on
voluntary compliance is effective monitoring of regulated entities). Michael asserts that
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is necessary for inducing compliance, a cooperative enforcement approach
may resonate better with regulated entities given a facility's willingness
to respond to market signals for better environmental management.3 Use
of a coercive enforcement approach may be more likely to generate resentment.8 4 Moreover, the use of a cooperative enforcement approach
might even prompt polluting facilities to respond to market signals more
strongly or at least increase the likelihood that a given facility will respond to those signals. This conjecture is speculative since no previous
study examines this particular interplay.
3.

The Coercive Response to the Cooperative Approach

Supporters of the deterrence model, however, have been wary of
claims that the cooperative approach is likely to engender higher levels
of compliance and that deterrence-based enforcement is likely to be counterproductive.8 5 Professors Rechtschaffen and Markell provide a good
summary of the arguments that have been made to rebut the contention
that a coercive enforcement approach is counterproductive:
[A] s a general proposition, there are several reasons for
skepticism about the argument that deterrence-based enforcement is counterproductive. First, this contention rests
on certain suppositions about enforcement behavior, most
notably that inspectors are rigid and legalistic and respond
to all violations with formal sanctions.... [Tihese assumptions are belied by studies showing that enforcement personnel in fact eschew formal, legalistic actions, and instead
rely heavily on informal negotiations (while using traditional
sanctions as a backup) to achieve compliance. Second, the
advocates of this position presuppose that most corporations generally are inclined to comply with the law for civic
or social reasons, an assumption that is problematic ....
Third, the cooperative model underemphasizes the economic pressures for noncompliance. Coaxing and persuasion

even if regulators choose a cooperative approach, "[r]esidual reliance on direct enforcement is necessary in a system of self-regulation." Id. at 548.
83 RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 31, at 230-31.
84Id. at 230.
5Id. at 231.
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may be very productive when firms are making good-faith
efforts to comply and have ample resources to do so. It is
far less likely to work when compliance will have significant financial consequences for a firm."6
Rechtschaffen and Markell also describe responses to the claim
that considerations that bear on the normal conduct of day-to-day business
actually provide regulated entities with sufficient incentives to comply
even without the threat of sanctions, making enforcement unnecessary.
In other words, while the potential for more efficient operation may induce some firms to comply with their regulatory obligations voluntarily,
some compliance measures will increase a firm's expenses, cutting against
its willingness to comply without the pressures provided by enforcement
action.8 8 Moreover, even if compliance makes business sense in the longterm, it may result in short-term financial losses that regulated firms
are unwilling to bear, given the pressure for corporate management to
provide immediate returns on shareholder investments.8 9 In addition, the
benefits of being perceived as "green" may be less important to some firms
than others; in particular, this factor may be a less significant inducement
toward compliance for firms that do not directly market consumer products. o In response to the claim that voluntary compliance may benefit
a regulated firm in the stock market, skeptics point out that many regulated firms are not publicly traded, and therefore will not be affected by
this factor.9 Investors may not be impressed by the disclosure of a firm's
noncompliance if they are not convinced that noncompliance will result
in a strong governmental response, which may well be the case under a
cooperative regime.9 2 For these reasons and those noted above, critics of
8

Id.A firm's ability to borrow money and the cost of borrowing may affect its willingness
to invest in compliance.
87 RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 31, at 218-20. Rechtschaffen and Markell,
however, do not assess the possibility of a cooperative enforcement approach prompting
a greater response to market forces or it being more effective in the presence of market
forces for better environmental protection. See id.
88 See id. at 222.
9 See id. at 221.
90
Id. at 222.
Id. at 224.
91
92
Id. at 221-25. With this exception, the critics' responses to the role of market forces that
is touted by supporters of the cooperative approach do not address the interplay between
market forces and the type of relationship between the regulator and the regulated entities. Id. Both regulators and investors may adjust their responses in accordance with the
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the cooperative approach suggest that regulated facilities that are parties
to a cooperative enforcement relationship, which deemphasizes sanctions
and the threat of sanctions, are unlikely to achieve levels of compliance
as great as the levels of compliance achieved when facilities are parties
to a coercive relationship, in which regulated facilities perceive regulators as inclined to initiate enforcement action that can adversely affect
the firm's bottom line.
Another criticism of the cooperative approach is its tendency
to reduce accountability and transparency.9 3 As Professor Markell has
explained:
This reduction in accountability may manifest itself in at
least three ways. First, regulated parties may gain additional leverage over the disposition of cases. Second, regulators may gain additional discretion to address cases as
they believe appropriate-the surfeit of options may provide additional insulation from public oversight or scrutiny. Third, as indicated above, there is the possibility
that the expanded tool box will reduce accountability in
the sense that it will relieve pressure on regulators to produce traditional results. Because of these possible consequences, Professor [David] Dana and others have suggested
that contractarian approaches are likely to benefit the regulated community and have the potential to disenfranchise
the interested public, at least to some degree.94
The cooperative approach also has the potential to undermine
what Rechtschaffen and Markell refer to as "the expressive function" of
deterrence-based enforcement, in that enforcement action "gives voice
to the public's desire to regulate and sanction undesirable behavior" by
conveying

nature of the alleged noncompliance. Regulators operating under either a cooperative or
coercive regime may tend to be more inclined to pursue enforcement actions for serious
violations. Similarly, investors and potential investors may be more likely to respond negatively to reports of what they perceive to be serious instances of noncompliance than to
reports of minor violations.
"
Markell, Slack in the Administrative State, supra note 5, at 56-57.
94
1d.
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a set of meanings about environmental violations that is
very different from that communicated by an overly cooperative-oriented approach, that puts an undue emphasis
on negotiation and conciliation. The message conveyed by
deterrence reaffirms for the public that environmental statutes are important and that transgressions are something
to be taken very seriously.s5
4.

Summary of the Debate over the Coercive and Cooperative
Approaches to Environmental Enforcement and Compliance

Scholars and environmental policymakers have conducted a spirited debate about the comparative merits of the coercive and cooperative
approaches to enforcement of the nation's environmental laws.96 Those
who support the coercive model regard the deterrence of violations as the
fundamental purpose of environmental enforcement.97 They regard enforcement actions whose goal is to impose sanctions that exceed the
economic benefits of noncompliance as the most effective way to induce
regulated entities to comply with their regulatory obligations.9" In their
view, the greater the likelihood and severity of the sanctions, the greater
the deterrent impact of enforcement activities. 9 Accordingly, proponents
of the coercive model believe that enforcement agencies must make it
"economically irrational for regulated entities to violate the law" °° and
that this economic penalty will only happen through the coercive presence
of enforcement officials.'0 ' Supporters of the cooperative approach to environmental enforcement focus more on compliance than deterrence.102
The cooperative approach includes a larger emphasis on both compliance
assistance and compliance incentives on the part of regulatory agencies.10 3
The cooperative approach to enforcement proceeds on the premise that
regulated entities react to a variety of motives that include not only
maximizing the bottom line, but also "internaliz[ing] the general societal

95

RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL,

supra note 31, at 235-37.

9 GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 1000.
17 See Markell, Slack in the Administrative State, supra note
5, at 22.
98
See id. at 47.

" See Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance, supra note 38, at 63-64.
100 RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 31, at 60.
10'

See Markell, Slack in the AdministrativeState, supra note 5, at 50.
Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation,supra note 66, at 1188.

102See
103 Id.
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norms about environmental protection," 10 4 taking advantage of good compliance records to enable a firm to market itself as green, and creating
an image of environmental responsibility that may attract investment. 105
The advocates of the cooperative approach contend that a coercive approach to enforcement may be counterproductive if it engenders intransigence and ill will on the part of regulated entities."°6 The advocates of
the coercive approach are skeptical of the significance of any factors other
than economically rational behavior in inducing compliance with regulatory obligations.' 0 7
Theory aside, is there any empirical evidence to back the claims
of either side of the debate about the comparative effectiveness of these
differing approaches to environmental enforcement and compliance? The
next subpart will address this question.
B.

Empirical Studies of Coercive vs. Cooperative Enforcement

To date, there is little empirical analysis on the use of cooperationoriented strategies. 0 8 In particular, few studies examine the comparative
efficacy of cooperation-oriented strategies. 10 9 One article analyzing the
use of the cooperative approach in regulation of water pollution in Canada
states that "past studies that have hailed the merits of cooperative enforcement have offered surprisingly little by way of empirical support.""0
There seems to be even less research that directly compares coercive and
cooperative strategies. According to Professor Rechtschaffen, "[tihe argument that cooperation works better than deterrence to achieve compliance
with environmental law is unconvincing. Most fundamentally, it is largely
untested.""' Rechtschaffen then quotes Raymond J. Burby & Robert G.
Paterson, saying that "there is little in the way of empirical evidence that
can be used in deciding which enforcement techniques [approaches based

104 RECHTCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 31, at 215.
105See id. at 218-20.
106 See Burby & Paterson, supra note 71, at 756.
107 See RECHTCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 31, at 231.
108 See, e.g., Shapiro & Rabinowitz, supra note 72, at 720 (arguing that there is "little
empirical evidence" to verify the assertion that agency cooperation with regulated entities will increase compliance).
'o9 See id.
0Kathryn Harrison, Is Cooperationthe Answer? CanadianEnvironmentalEnforcement
in ComparativeContext, 14 J. OF POLY ANALYSIS & MGMT. 221, 223 (1995).
...
Rechtschaffen, Deterrencevs. Cooperation,supra note 66, at 1205.
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on deterrence or cooperation] are most likely to achieve113regulatory
goals."" 2 The evidence that does exist is largely anecdotal.
One researcher has noted that rates of compliance with water
pollution controls are "significantly lower" in the pulp and paper industry
in Canada, where the cooperative approach to enforcement is generally
followed, than in the United States, concluding that the growing consensus in favor of cooperative enforcement is misplaced." 4 Another researcher
concluded that "[tihe best performing state programs [for nonpoint
sources of water pollution] tend to be those that use a highly coercive
approach, both with the private sector and in securing local government
adoption and enforcement of pollution control regulations.""' Still others
112

Id. (quoting Burby & Paterson, supra note 71, at 757).
e.g., Shapiro & Rabinowitz, supra note 72, at 720 (asserting that "[t]here is little

113See,

empirical evidence on the relative effectiveness of cooperative and legalistic enforcement
policies," and that "[m]ost of the evidence is anecdotal and open to dispute").
14 Harrison, supra note 110, at 222 ("[Tlhe conclusion that rates of compliance are significantly lower in Canada than the United States casts doubt on the growing consensus in
favor of cooperative enforcement."). Harrison also concluded that, "[ i n the case of the pulp
and paper industry, the cooperative Canadian approach to enforcement has delivered disappointing results compared to the more adversarial U.S. approach. This study therefore
casts doubt on the relatively untested assumption that cooperative enforcement is equally
if not more effective than the adversarial approach." Id. at 240.
115Burby, supra note 77, at 368 (claiming that his study shows that EPA and the states
"cannot expect to reduce nonpoint source pollution substantially through programs that
lack coercion"). For purposes of the CWA, a "point source" includes "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance.., from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33
U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2007). Any source of water pollution that does not qualify as a point
source is a nonpoint source, which the Act does not define. See id; see also Environmental
Protection Agency, Nonpoint Source Pollution: The Nation's Largest Water Quality
Problem, http'//www.epa.gov/owow/nps/facts/pointl.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2007).
According to the EPA, nonpoint source pollution is caused by diffuse
sources that are not regulated as point sources and normally is associated with agricultural, silvicultural and urban runoff, runoff from construction activities, etc.... In practical terms, nonpoint source pollution
does not result from a discharge at a specific, single location (such as
a single pipe) but generally results from land runoff, precipitation, atmospheric deposition, or percolation.
United States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 652 n.3 (2d Cir. 1993) (Oakes, J.,
dissenting) (citing OFFICE OF WATER REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS, EPA OFFICE OF WATER,
NONpOINT SOURCE GUIDANCE 3 (1987)). Although the CWA largely ignores nonpoint sources
of water pollution, nothing in the statute prohibits the states from regulating them. 33
U.S.C. § 1370 (providing that nothing in the CWA precludes the states from imposing
pollution abatement requirements more stringent than federal standards adopted under
the CWA). If a state chooses to adopt enforceable restrictions for nonpoint sources, such as
mandatory best management practices, it has the option of overseeing compliance with
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have concluded that the impact of the government's choice of enforcement
strategies on compliance with regulatory obligations depends on the kind
of regulatory standard at issue" 6 and that, in particular, the cooperative
approach is better suited to inducing compliance with performance standards than with specification standards." 7 Finally, a recent study by
Professor Andreen concludes that compliance rates for major dischargers
under the CWA "have remained stubbornly static" during the period
during which many states have "replaced traditional enforcement mechanisms with some form of cooperation-based strategy.""' He concludes,
based on that evidence, that "[tihe new, more flexible approach has not
improved rates of compliance."" 9

those restrictions pursuant to either a coercive or cooperative enforcement approach. See
GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 513 ("The CWA traditionally has subjected nonpoint
source controls to softer state-run planning and management programs.").
116 Both design (or specification) and performance standards typically specify a goal that
takes the form of a mandatory cap, often expressed numerically, on discharges. Sidney
A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Goals,Instruments,and EnvironmentalPolicy Choice,
10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 297,305 (2000). Under the CWA, EPA derives this effluent
limitation on the basis of its determination of the level of pollution control that it is feasible
for a particular group of regulated entities to achieve. See GLICKSMAN ET AL., supranote
3, at 542. Design and performance standards diverge, however, with respect to the degree
of discretion afforded to regulated facilities in determining how to achieve the applicable
effluent limitation. Shapiro & Glicksman, supra, at 305.
[U]nder a design standard the agency defines the method by which regulated entities are required to achieve the goal-such as by installing
and operating a particular kind of pollution control technology or work
practice-whereas under a performance standard, regulated entities
are free to achieve the goal any way they want. They can use the model
technology or work practice identified by the agency as the one that
makes compliance possible, or they can devise alternative means of meeting the goal. In theory at least, regulated entities subject to a performance standard have an incentive to develop such alternative means
if they provide a more efficient means of achieving the regulatory goal.
Id. Performance standards, not specification standards, are the norm under the federal
pollution control laws, including the CWA. Id. at 306.
17
According to Burby and Paterson, " [wihile deterrence ofviolations through monitoring
and inspections stimulates compliance with both specification and performance standards,
building commitment and capacity to obey the law through a cooperative approach to
enforcement has much more impact on the degree of compliance attained for performance
standards than for specification standards." Burby & Paterson, supra note 71, at 754, 766
(arguing that "[deterrent measures provide a needed backstop for dealing with recalcitrant firms who evade regulatory requirements for financial gain or merely through sloth
or incompetence").
11' Andreen, supra note 16, at 19.
119 Id.
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While these studies help to inform our understanding of cooperative enforcement strategies, they represent only rudimentary steps. Only
one of these studies gathers facility-specific data on the type of relationship between regulators and regulated entities. 120 Importantly, none of
these studies considers this relationship as consisting of multiple dimensions. In this Article, we examine both of these aspects of the regulatory
relationship. In particular, we distinguish between the relative presence
of one enforcement approach or the other by assessing multiple dimensions. We demonstrate that, in reality, no single type of approach exists
for many given facilities. Instead, the relationship is represented by shades
of gray. This assessment demonstrates that an accurate depiction of the
regulator-regulated entity relationship should precede any analysis of
the comparative efficacy of coercive and cooperative enforcement regimes.
II.

COERCIVE AND COOPERATIVE ENFORCEMENT IN THE CHEMICAL
INDUSTRY

In light of the sharp debate between those who advocate moving
away from a traditional deterrence-based approach to achieving compliance with environmental statutes such as the CWA and those who are
skeptical that such a shift will improve compliance, it would be useful to
know more about what kinds of relationships actually exist between
regulators and point sources regulated under the CWA. Our study attempts to shed light on these relationships. To do so, we designed and
implemented a survey of regulated facilities in the chemical industry.'2 '
The survey includes a series of questions that require the respondents to
characterize certain aspects of their interactions with regulators, including
the nature of their relationship with CWA regulators. In particular, the
survey includes a series ofquestions that are designed to indicate whether
a particular respondent has a cooperative or a coercive relationship with
state or federal regulatory authorities. This Part describes the methods
that we used to elicit responses to these questions. It also describes our
analysis of the survey responses and the implications of our analytical
results on any future research that examines the comparative advan120 See Harrison, supra note 110.
121

The survey questionnaire was developed with the assistance of Mark Cohen, the

Director of the Vanderbilt Center for Environmental Management. The survey was pretested with a sample of 20 facilities in the Kansas City metropolitan area. For a full copy
of the survey, see EPA Grant Facility Survey (2002), http://www.ku.edu/pri/CEP/EPA/
surveyinstrument.pdf [hereinafter EPA Grant Facility Survey].
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tages and disadvantages of the coercive and cooperative approaches to
environmental enforcement.
A.

Survey Sample Selection and Respondent Participation

Our study examines the relationships between CWA regulators
and point sources in the chemical industry whose discharges are subject
to effluent limitations set forth in NPDES permits. We chose the industrial sector of chemical and allied products as the focus of our study because
it serves as an excellent vehicle for examining the efficacy of government
interventions on corporate environmental performance. EPA has demonstrated a strong interest in this sector,122 and regards one of the sub-sectors,
industrial organics, as a priority industrial sector.12 3 The chemical industry is responsible for a significant portion of the nation's industrial output
and a significant portion of all wastewater discharges by facilities subject
to CWA regulation.12 4 However, the chemical industry is not necessarily
representative of all industrial sectors. Indeed, its unique attributes contribute to our interest in studying it. Some firms in the chemical industry,
for example, have demonstrated an interest in promoting pollution reduction and prevention through efforts prompted by the Responsible Care
program, which is a voluntary management initiative supported by the
American Chemical Council. 2 5
22

1

See, e.g., U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-305-R-96-002, CHEMICAL INDUSTRY NATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTAL BASELINE REPORT: 1990-1994 at ES-3 (1997), available at http://www

.epa.gov/comphance/resourcespublications/assistancesectors/chembaseline994.pdf;

U.S.

ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY & CHEM. MFRS. ASS'N, EPA-305-R-99-001, ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS

PILOT PROJECT, at ii (1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/
publications/assistance/sectors/rootcauseanalysis.pdf.
123 See, e.g., Paul S. Farber & E. Lynn Grayson, A Survival Guide to Multimedia
Inspections: EPA's Multi-Media Enforcement & Inspection Program,ENVTL. PROT. MAG.,
Jan. 1999, available at http://www.kerleyink.com/technology/MULTI-ME.htm.
124 The U.S. chemical industry is the largest in the world and is responsible, on a valueadded basis, for about 1.9% of U.S. gross domestic product. See ALLEN J. LENZ & JOHN
LAFRANCE, MEETING THE CHALLENGE: U.S. INDUSTRY FACES THE 21ST CENTURY: THE

CHEMICAL INDUSTRY (1996), availableat http://www.technology.gov/Reports/chemicals/

chemical.pdf. The chemical industry historically has been a large generator of wastes disposed of both on land and water. For example, "[tihe chemical and allied products industry accounts for 49% of hazardous waste generation" in the United States. JEFFREY
G. MILLER & CRAIG N. JOHNSTON, THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL AND
REMEDIATION 7 (1996).
125
See, e.g., Dow Chemical Company, Responsible Care, httpJ/www.dow.com/commitments
care/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2007) (describing Responsible Care as "a voluntary initiative
within the global chemical industry to safely handle our products from inception in the
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The original population of facilities chosen for administration of
our survey was drawn from EPA's Permit Compliance System ("PCS")
database as of September 2001.126 This original population included 2,596
chemical facilities, which were supposed to have NPDES permits for pollution discharge into water. 127 Of these facilities, 499 were designated as
major facilities and 2,097 as minor facilities. 121 We included in the survey
sample only facilities that met the following criteria: (1) they were still
in operation as of 2002; (2) they held an NPDES permit; (3) they discharged regulated pollutants into surface water bodies; and (4) their contact information was available from either EPA or alternative sources,
such as phone books. After excluding the facilities that did not fit the relevant criteria, the population surveyed was 1,003 facilities. From this
group of eligible respondents, 267 facilities completed at least 90% of
the survey, implying a survey response rate of 26.6%. Although this rate
may seem fairly low, it is comparable to previous large-scale surveys of
129
industrial sectors.
We find no systematic state or regional bias in participation when
we compare the original sample of 1,003 potentially eligible facilities to
the 267 facilities that actually completed the survey. For example, only
the Midwest region is slightly over-represented in the response group,
and only the Northeast region is slightly under-represented. These differences, however, are small. Across most of the states the difference
between representation in the original sample and representation in the
response group averages less than 2%. There is some difference in the
participation of major and minor facilities. In the original sample, 69% of
facilities were minor facilities and 31% were major facilities. In the group

research laboratory, through manufacture and distribution, to ultimate disposal, and to
involve the public in our decision-making processes").
126 The PCS database includes data on inspections performed by federal and state regulators and on enforcement actions taken by federal administrative agencies and courts.
Environmental Protection Agency, Water Discharge Permits (PCS), http://www.epa.gov/
enviro/htmllpcs/adhoc.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2007).

See DIETRICH EARNHART ET AL., SHAPING CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL BEHAVIOR AND
PERFORMANCE: THE IMPACT OF ENFORCEMENT AND NON-ENFORCEMENT TOOLS 96 (2006),
127

availableat http://www.ipsr.ku.edu/CEP/EPA/finalreport.pdf.
128
Id.
.29 See, e.g., Magali Delmas & Michael Toffel, Institutional Pressures and Environmental
Strategies 17 (University of California, Santa Barbara, Working Paper No. 07-022,2005),
availableat httpJ/www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/07-022.pff (stating that a 17% response rate
in a survey in which 3160 people were contacted "is comparable to other recent surveybased strategy research").
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of survey respondents, major facilities are slightly over-represented at
we chose not to compare the
39%. Because this difference is significant,
130
responses of major and minor facilities.
Survey Responses Relating to Coercive and Cooperative
Enforcement

B.

Our survey includes a series of questions designed to indicate
whether a particular respondent has a cooperative or a coercive relationship with state or federal regulatory authorities. The question that most
directly solicits information about the nature of the relationship between
CWA regulators and regulated facilities simply asks the respondents to
characterize the nature of the way in which the water regulator with
whom they typically work treats the facility and its employees.' 3 ' The
categories available to respondents were: "generally coercive," "generally
cooperative," and "don't know." 1 32 As Table 1 indicates, only 2.7% state
that the relationship is generally coercive, while 96.2% state that it is generally cooperative.' 3 3 The vast majority of respondents appear to regard
their relationships with their principal regulators as cooperative.
Other survey questions solicit responses about particular aspects
of the relationship between regulators and regulated entities that we regard as relevant to whether those relationships are generally cooperative
or generally coercive. For example, we asked each respondent to characterize the manner in which the regulator with whom they typically works
treats the facility and its employees.' The categories for this question
were "always fair," "sometimes fair, sometimes unfair," "always unfair or

.3 Statistical analysis indicates that only the distinction between minor and major facilities
proves important for explaining whether a contacted facility completed the administered
survey. This statistical analysis demonstrates that neither the preceding history of inspections nor the preceding enforcement actions against a particular facility explain
whether a contacted facility responded to the survey. Moreover, the analysis demonstrates
that the decision to respond is not explained by the EPA region in which a particular
facility resides. Even if the threat of inspections and enforcement actions varies across
EPA regions, this variation does not predict whether a contacted facility responds to the
survey. The analysis is not able to control for variation across states in a similar fashion
given the large number of individual states, relative to the sample size.
131

EPA Grant Facility Survey, supra note 121, at 19.

132

Id.

133

See tbl.1.

134

EPA Grant Facility Survey, supra note 121, at 19.
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arbitrary," and "don't know." 35 We consider the first category to be more
indicative of a cooperative relationship than the second and the second
to reflect a more cooperative relationship than the third. As indicated in
Table 2, no respondent reports that the treatment is always unfair, 18.8%
of the respondents report that it sometimes fair, sometimes unfair, and
80.1% report that it is always fair. 136 Thus, most of the respondents appear to perceive their relationships with regulators as relatively cooperative. The percentage of respondents indicating a cooperative relationship
under this question is lower, however, than the percentage based on the
most direct assessment of the overall relationship.'37
An additional question focuses on whether the regulated facility
typically works with a federal or state water regulator. 3 ' Our conjecture
is that regulated facilities may tend to work more cooperatively with state
regulators than with federal regulators because state regulators tend to
work closer to the regulated facility. Regulated facilities may be more concerned about maintaining cooperative relationships with regulators who
are part of the same community in which they live and work. As Table 3
indicates, 96.5% of the respondents report that their facility typically
works with state regulators, while only 1.1% report that they typically
work with federal regulators.' 39
We were also curious about whether facilities typically worked
with the same individual water regulator, or multiple regulators that
varied with the circumstances. 40 We posit that regulated entities will
typically find it easier to maintain a cooperative relationship with a single
regulator than with multiple regulators whose approaches to compliance
may differ and who may not understand the facility's past compliance
history. Table 4 indicates that 56.5% of the respondents report that they
typically work with the same regulator, while 41.9% report that they typically work with multiple regulators.'
135 d.
136 See

tbl.2.

137 Compare tbl.1, with tbl.2.
138 EPA

Grant Facility Survey, supra note 121, at 18.

139 See tbl.3. The predominance of state regulators reflects the fact that EPA has delegated

NPDES permitting authority to state environmental agencies in most states. According
to EPA's website, only five states have not received authority to administer at least some
aspect of the NPDES permit program. See Environmental Protection Agency, National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System: State Program Status, http://cfpub.epa.gov/
npdes/statestats.cfm (last visited Apr. 15, 2007).
40
See EPA Grant Facility Survey, supra note 121, at 18.
141 See tbl.4.
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Facilities were also asked whether, over the past three years, any
individual in the facility asked the supervisor of the facility's water regulator to help with a difference of opinion between the facility and the regulator. 14 2 We regard a negative answer to represent less friction between the
regulator and the facility than a positive answer. A positive answer may
reflect a sign that a previously cooperative relationship has gone sour.143
As Table 5 reveals, 79.8% of the respondents state that their facility did
not seek help from the supervisor of the regulator, while 19% state that
the facility did so.' Thus, for at least a sizeable number of the facilities,
there appears to have been some period of non-cooperation, or at least
a difference of opinion, between CWA regulators and regulated facilities.
A related question addresses whether, over the past three years,
any individual at the facility asked a local, state, or federal elected official
to help the facility with a difference of opinion between the facility and a
water regulator. 4 5 We regard a negative answer as more reflective of a
cooperative relationship than an affirmative answer, for the reasons previously described. As Table 6 indicates, 94.2% of the respondents report
that no one contacted an elected official to help with a difference of opinion
between a regulator and the regulated facility. Only 4.6% report that the
facility made such a request. 146 For those respondents who report that
they contacted an elected official, a follow-up question inquired whether
the official was most often a local official, a state official, or a federal official.147 23.5% of the relevant respondents report that the elected official
contacted by the facility was most often a local official; 41.2% report that
it was a state official; only 5.9% report that it was a federal official.
The final question in the portion of the survey addressing coercive
and cooperative approaches attempts to discern the type of relationship
existing between the regulator and the regulated entity indirectly with
the help of a specific hypothetical scenario. This question asks how likely
it is that the respondent's facility would allow regulators access to plant

142

EPA Grant Facility Survey, supra note 121, at 19.

14 Alternatively, the appeal to a regulator's supervisor may represent an effort by the

regulated facility to escape the adverse consequences of a pre-existing coercive relationship
with a non-responsive regulator.
'"See tbl.5.
4"EPA Grant Facility Survey, supra note 121, at 19.
146 See tbl.6.
147 EPA Grant Facility Survey, supra note 121, at 20.
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facilities if they arrived unannounced.1 4 8 The answers available to respondents were "always likely," "likely," "somewhat likely," "not at all
likely," and "don't know."' 4 9 The more likely the respondent is to allow
unannounced access, the more cooperative we regard the relationship
between the respondent's plant and the CWA regulator. As Table 7 indicates, 90% of the respondents report that it is always likely, while none
say it is not at all likely.15 ° These responses provide evidence that companies are generally willing to cooperate with regulators performing unannounced inspections.
In addition to the set of questions that reflect on relations between
the regulator and the regulated entity, the survey includes a pair of questions relating to the respondents' attitudes about the value of regulation.' 5 '
The first ofthese two questions addresses whether each respondent thinks
it should be the government's responsibility to impose strict laws to control
industry's impact on the environment.'5 2 The categories for this question
were "definitely should be," "probably should be," "probably should not be,"
"definitely should not be," and "don't know."5 3 We regard an individual
who thinks it is the government's responsibility to impose such laws to
be more likely to cooperate with its facility's regulator than one who does
not think so. As Table 8 indicates, 57.1% of the respondents report that
it definitely should be, while 35.5% report that it probably should be.
Only a total of 6.2% of the respondents report that this probably should
not be or definitely should not be the role of the government.'

'48Id. at 18.
149

Id.

150 See tbl.7.
51

The questions discussed so far in this Article focus on various aspects of the facility's

relationship with its regulator. The next group of questions focus on the individual respondent's attitudes toward government regulation and the likelihood of compliance by facilities
in the absence of regulation.
152 EPA Grant Facility Survey, supra note 121, at 26.

153Id.

154 See tbl.8. It is not unusual to portray corporate officials as resentful towards the
intrusion ofthe government into their business affairs, particularly when the government
is forcing the business to undertake activities that may potentially reduce corporate
profitability. The high percentage of respondents who answer this question affirmatively
("definitely should be" or "probably should be") may therefore seem surprising. These
results may be attributed to the identity of the respondents. Most of those answering the
survey were environmental managers likely to feel that their jobs are important, and, in
turn, likely to feel that compliance with environmental regulations is also important. These
attitudes may or may not reflect the views of others at the facility.
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The second question in this pair addresses the extent to which the
respondents agree or disagree with this statement: "Companies will behave responsibly when it concerns environmental protection, regardless
of government regulation."'5 5 The categories are "strongly agree," "agree,"
"neither agree nor disagree," "disagree," "strongly disagree," and "don't
know." 5 ' We regard those who strongly agree or agree as more likely to
cooperate with regulators than those who do not. As Table 9 indicates,
11.6% of the respondents strongly agree with the statement, 29% agree,
9.7% neither agree nor disagree, 37.7% disagree, and 11.2% strongly disagree. 157 Thus, a total of 49% of the respondents disagree to some extent
with the notion that industry would behave responsibly in the absence of
government regulation. Only 40.6% of the respondents believe that regulation is not necessary to ensure responsible industry behavior. In part,
the respondents may believe that, even though their facilities would prefer
to behave responsibly even in the absence of government regulation, their
competitors might not. If their facility behaves responsibly and competitors do not, those competitors may gain an advantage in the market as a
result of their avoidance of environmental control costs. Thus, regulation
is necessary to provide a level playing field.'
These responses, together with the responses to the previous
question about the government's responsibility to regulate, seem to indicate agreement among many of the respondents that government regulation of activities that create risks of environmental harm is not only
legitimate but necessary. This is consistent with other survey results.'5 9
It is also possible that the responses to these two questions are an expression of a fairly solid recognition among the industry respondents of
the utility of a coercive enforcement presence, the absence of which may
decrease incentives to comply with regulatory obligations. 6 °
155 EPA Grant Facility Survey, supra note 121, at 27.
156Id.
157

See tbl.9.

15' Professor Plater's conversations with various executives also demonstrate the need

for regulation: "[A]s one candid executive once said to me: Actually, we all need mandatory
government regulations to give us a compelling reason to do the right thing and make sure
our competitors do too; 'Good fences make good neighbors." Zygmunt J. B. Plater, Dealing
with Dumb and Dumber: The Continuing Mission of Citizen Environmentalism, 20 J.
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 9, 31 (2005).
159See, e.g., Robert R. Kuehn, The Limits of Devolving Enforcement of FederalEnvironmental Laws, 70 TUL.L. REV. 2373, 2387 (1996) ("Half of all corporate environmental
managers believe that the federal government's enforcement is inadequate, citing the
need for more enforcement to ensure that all companies are treated equally.").
160 On the other hand, those who conclude that the government has legitimate
environmental protection responsibilities, and that companies will not behave responsibly

2007]

C.

THE REGULATOR-REGULATED ENTITY RELATIONSHIP

635

Correlationsand Cross-Tabulations

This subpart compares the responses to the individual questions
described above that relate to the relationship between the regulator and
the regulated entity. In particular, this subpart explains and interprets
the correlations between all possible pairs of responses, such as the
correlation between the overall type of relationship-coercive versus
cooperative-and the treatment of a regulated entity by its regulator.
The responses to all possible pairs of questions are also cross-tabulated,
and these cross-tabulations are interpreted. This analysis demonstrates
that the relationship between a regulator and a regulated entity consists
of multiple dimensions. In other words, no single underlying dimension
seems to reflect all of the responses.
First, we calculated and interpreted the correlations between all
possible pairs of responses. Table 10 reports the Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients. 161 In general, these statistics reveal only weak correlations between the various measures capturing the relationship between
the regulator and the regulated entity. Of the twenty-one pairwise correlations, only six are positive and statistically significantly different
from zero (i.e. the p-value associated with the correlation coefficient is
no greater than 0.10). Of these significant correlations, the largest magnitude is only 0.35, indicating limited or no connection between these
pairs of responses. Five of the correlations are negative, though the coefficients are insignificantly different from zero. The remaining ten correlations are positive but insignificantly different from zero.
Second, we cross-tabulated the responses to all possible pairs of
questions and interpreted these cross-tabulations. To facilitate the creation and interpretation of the cross-tabulations, we collapsed each response into two categories, excluding the "don't know" responses. This
cleanly divides responses into indicating the presence of either a coercive
relationship or a cooperative relationship. This re-arrangement affects
only two individual questions and responses: (1) for treatment of the regulated entity by its regulator, an "always fair" response was taken to indicate a cooperative relationship and responses of"sometimes fair, sometimes
in the absence of government regulation, might be more willing to cooperate with regulators than those who think government regulation is illegitimate and unnecessary. Some
respondents may even believe that a government enforcement presence is legitimate and
necessary in the abstract, but still react in a hostile and non-cooperative manner when
their facility becomes the focus of an enforcement action.
161See tbl.10.
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unfair" were thought to indicate a coercive relationship; (2) for the question regarding likelihood of allowing regulators access to plant facilities
without announcement, an "always likely" response was taken to indicate a cooperative relationship and responses of "likely" or "somewhat
likely" were thought to indicate a coercive relationship. The resulting
cross-tabulations are reported in Table 11. As with the correlation coefficients, these statistics reveal less than complete overlap between
the various measures capturing the relationship between the regulator
and the regulated entity. Our analysis focuses on the cells of each crosstabulation that demonstrate a conflict in the classification of the regulatorregulated entity relationship based on the two measures analyzed. In
other words, we focus on situations where one measure indicates a coercive relationship, while the other measure indicates a cooperative relationship. These conflicting classifications are indicated by the diagonal cells
of each two-by-two table.
We begin our interpretation with those cross-tabulations that
involve the overall nature of the relationship between the regulator and
the regulated entities: coercive versus cooperative. Tables 11(d), 11(i),
11(m), 11(p), 11(s), and 1 1(t) report these cross-tabulations. As shown in
these tables, sometimes those who report that they generally have cooperative relationships also report that particular aspects of their relationships are more consistent with a coercive than with a cooperative
relationship. The converse is also true: those who report that they have
coercive relationships nevertheless describe some aspects of their relationships with regulators in a manner than seems to reflect cooperation. For
example, Table 11(m) reports the cross-tabulations between the consistency of the specific regulator (same individual regulator versus multiple
regulators) and the overall nature of the regulator-regulated entity relationship.'6 2 As shown, a large portion of the respondents (41%) provide
conflicting indications of the relationship between the regulator and the
regulated entity.163 Moreover, of those facilities experiencing a coercive
relationship, 71% are nevertheless working with the same individual
regulator. 164 As stronger evidence of this conflict, 95% of those facilities
162 See

tbl.11(m).
percentage is calculated from the lower left and top right cells. In other words,
the addition of .78% to 40.39% is 41%. This same formula is followed for subsequent
calculations of this nature.
" This percentage is calculated from the sample numbers located in the upper and lower
left cells. In other words, the upper cell sample number is five and the lower cell sample
number is two. The total sample size of coercive relationship respondents is seven. Five
163 This
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working with multiple regulators nevertheless experience a cooperative
relationship. '6
To complete our analysis, we systematically interpret each of the
twenty-one pairwise cross-tabulations shown in Table 11. Tables 11(a)
through 11(f) report the cross-tabulations that involve the likelihood of
allowing regulators access to plant facilities without announcement.
Table 11(a) reports the cross-tabulation between the likelihood of allowing regulators access to plant facilities without announcement and the
typical type of regulator (state versus federal). As shown, only 10% of the
respondents provide conflicting indications of the relationship between
the regulator and the regulated entity. Yet, of those facilities working
mostly with a federal regulator, 67% are still always likely to allow access
to their plant operations in response to an unannounced visit. Of those
likely to allow access, 96% still work mostly
facilities who were not always
1 66
regulator.
state
a
with
Table 11(b) reports the cross-tabulation between the likelihood of
allowing regulators access to plant facilities without announcement and
the type of interaction with the regulator (same individual regulator versus
multiple regulators). As shown, 43% of the respondents provide conflicting
indications of the relationship between the regulator and the regulated
entity. Of those facilities working with multiple regulators, 91% are still
always likely to allow access to their plant operations in response to an
unannounced visit. Of those facilities who were not always likely to allow
access, 46% still work with the same individual regulator. 67
Table 11(c) reports the cross-tabulation between the likelihood of
allowing regulators access to plant facilities without announcement and
the treatment of the regulated entity by its regulator. As shown, 26% of
the respondents provide conflicting indications of the relationship between the regulator and the regulated entity. As stronger evidence, of
those facilities not receiving always fair treatment, 94% are still always
likely to allow access to their plant operations in response to an unan-

divided by seven and multiplied by 100 equals 71%. This same formula is followed for
subsequent calculations of this nature.
165 This percentage is calculated from the sample numbers located in the upper left and
upper right cells. In other words, the upper left cell sample size is five and the upper right
cell sample size is 103. Combined, the total sample number of coercive, same individual
regulators is 108. One hundred and three divided by 108 and multiplied by 100 equals
95%. This same formula is followed for subsequent calculations of this nature.
166 See tbl.1(a).
167

See tbl.11(b).
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nounced visit. Of those facilities who were not always likely to allow ac168
cess, 88% still receive always fair treatment.
Table 11(d) reports the cross-tabulation between the likelihood of
allowing regulators access to plant facilities without announcement and
the overall nature of the relationship (coercive versus cooperative). As
shown, 12% of the respondents provide conflicting indications of the
relationship between the regulator and the regulated entity. Despite this
limited evidence, of those facilities in a coercive relationship, 100% are
still always likely to allow access to their plant operations in response to
an unannounced visit. Of those facilities who were not always likely to
allow access, 100% still maintain a cooperative relationship.1 69
Table 1 1(e) reports the cross-tabulation between the likelihood of
allowing regulators access to plant facilities without announcement and
the request for assistance from the regulator's supervisor. As shown, 25%
of the respondents provide conflicting indications of the relationship between the regulator and the regulated entity. Of those facilities that requested assistance, 90% are still always likely to allow access to their plant
operations in response to an unannounced visit. Of those facilities who were
not always likely to allow access, 79% still found no need for assistance. 10
Table 11(f) reports the cross-tabulation between the likelihood of
allowing regulators access to plant facilities without announcement and
the request for assistance from an elected official. As shown, 13% of the
respondents provide conflicting indications of the relationship between
the regulator and the regulated entity. Of those facilities that requested
assistance, 83% are still always likely to allow access to their plant operations in response to an unannounced visit. It is also notable that, of those
facilities who were not always likely to allow access, 92% still found no
17 1
need for assistance.
Tables 1 1(g) through 11(k) report the remaining cross-tabulations
that involve the typical type of regulator (state versus federal). This set
of cross-tabulations does not reveal an incomplete overlap between the
measures capturing the regulator-regulated entity relationship because
the number of respondents working mainly with a state regulator is so
small: only two facilities for Tables 11(g) through 11(I), and three facilities for Tables 11(j) and 11(k). Table 11(g) reports the cross-tabulation
168See
169See

tbl.11(c).

tbl.11(d).
See tbl.11(e).
171See tbl.11(f).
170
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between the typical type of regulator (state versus federal), and the type
of interaction with the regulator (same individual regulator versus multiple regulators). As shown, 41% of the respondents provide conflicting
indications of the relationship between the regulator and the regulated
entity. Of those facilities that work with multiple regulators, 100% are
working mostly with a federal regulator. No facilities work with the same
17 2
federal regulator.
Table 11(h) reports the cross-tabulation between the typical type
of regulator (state versus federal), and the treatment of the regulated entity by its regulator. As shown, 19% of the respondents provide conflicting
indications of the relationship between the regulator and the regulated
entity. Of those facilities not receiving always fair treatment, 98% are
working mostly with a federal regulator. Of those facilities who work
mostly with a state regulator, 50% always receive fair treatment." 3
Table 11(i) reports the cross-tabulation between the typical type
of regulator (state versus federal), and the overall relationship between
the regulator and the facility. As shown, only 4% of the respondents provide conflicting indications of the relationship between the regulator and
the regulated entity. Yet, of those facilities experiencing a coercive relationship, 100% are working mostly with a federal regulator. Moreover,
of those facilities who work mostly with a state regulator, 100% experience a cooperative relationship.'7 4
Table 11(j) reports the cross-tabulation between the typical type
of regulator (state versus federal), and a request for assistance from the
regulator's supervisor. As shown, 21% of the respondents provide conflicting indications of the relationship between the regulator and the regulated
entity. Of those facilities that requested assistance, 100% are working
mostly with a federal regulator. Of those facilities who work mostly with
175
a state regulator, 100% found no need for assistance.
Table 1 1(k) reports the cross-tabulation between the typical type
of regulator (state versus federal), and a request for assistance from an
elected official. As shown, only 6% of the respondents provide conflicting
indications of the relationship between the regulator and the regulated

172See

tbl.11(g).

171 See tbl.11(h).
"

175

See tbl.11(i).

See tbl.11(j).
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entity. Yet, of those facilities that requested assistance, 100% are working mostly with a federal regulator. Moreover, of those facilities who work
mostly with a state regulator, 100% found no need for assistance.1 76
Tables 11(1) through 11(o) report the remaining cross-tabulations
that involve the type of interaction with the regulator (same individual regulator versus multiple regulators). Table 1 (1) reports the cross-tabulations
between the type of interaction with the regulator(same individual versus
multiple regulators), and the treatment of the regulated entity by its regulator. As shown, 37% of the respondents provide conflicting indications
of the relationship between the regulator and the regulated entity. Of
those facilities not receiving always fair treatment, 65% are working with
the same individual regulator. Of those facilities
working with multiple
177
regulators, 88% receive always fair treatment.
Table 11(m) reports the cross-tabulations between the type of interaction with the regulator (same individual versus multiple regulators), and
the overall regulator-regulated entity relationship (coercive versus cooperative). As shown, a large portion of the respondents (41%) provide conflicting indications of the relationship between the regulator and the regulated
entity. Of those facilities experiencing a coercive relationship, 71% are
working with the same individual regulator. Of those facilities working
1 7v
with multiple regulators, 99% experience a cooperative relationship.
Table 11(n) reports the cross-tabulations between the type of interaction with the regulator (same individual versus multiple regulators),
and a request for assistance from the regulator's supervisor. As shown,
a large portion of the respondents (43%) provide conflicting indications of
the relationship between the regulator and the regulated entity. Of those
facilities that requested assistance, 49% are working with the same individual regulator. Of those facilities working with multiple regulators, 83%
found no need for assistance.1 7 9
Table 11(o) reports the cross-tabulations between the type of interaction with the regulator (same individual versus multiple regulators),
and a request for assistance from an elected official. As shown, a large portion of the respondents (43%) provide conflicting indications of the relationship between the regulator and the regulated entity. Of those facilities
that requested assistance, 50% are working with the same individual
176 See tbl.11(k).

See tbl.11().
See tbl.11(m).
179 See tbl.11(n).
177
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regulator. Of those facilities working with multiple regulators, 96% found
no need for assistance. 8 0
Tables 1 1(p) through 1 1(r) report the remaining cross-tabulations
that involve the treatment of the regulated entity by its regulator. Table
11(p) reports the cross-tabulations between the treatment of the regulated
entity by its regulator and the overall nature of the regulator-regulated
entity relationship (coercive versus cooperative). As shown, 16% of the respondents provide conflicting indications ofthe relationship between the
regulator and the regulated entity. Of those facilities not always receiving
fair treatment, 86% are still experiencing a cooperative relationship. None
of the facilities that experience a coercive relationship receive "always
fair" treatment. In this case, the two measures of the regulator-regulated
entity relationship fully align.'
Table 1 1(q) reports the cross-tabulations between the treatment of
the regulated entity by its regulator and a request for assistance from the
regulator's supervisor. As shown, a substantial portion of the respondents
(24%) provide conflicting indications of the relationship between the regulator and the regulated entity. Of those facilities that requested assistance, 63% are receiving "always fair" treatment. Of those facilities not
receiving "always fair" treatment, 63% still found no need for assistance.8 2
Table 11(r) reports the cross-tabulations between the treatment
of the regulated entity by its regulator and a request for assistance from
an elected official. As shown, a substantial portion of the respondents
(21%) provide conflicting indications of the relationship between the regulator and the regulated entity. Of those facilities that requested assistance, 67% are receiving "always fair" treatment. More importantly, of
those facilities not receiving "always fair" treatment, 92% still found no
8 3
need for assistance.
Tables 1l(s) and 1 1(t) report the remaining cross-tabulations that
involve the overall nature of the regulator-regulated entity relationship
(coercive versus cooperative). Table li(s) reports the cross-tabulations
between the overall nature of the regulator-regulated entity relationship
and a request for assistance from the regulator's supervisor. As shown,
18% ofthe respondents provide conflicting indications of the relationship
between the regulator and the regulated entity. Of those facilities that
180See

181See

tbl.11(o).
tbl.11(p).

182See

tbl.1l(q).

''See tbl.11(r).
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requested assistance, 90% are experiencing a reportedly cooperative relationship. Of those facilities experiencing a coercive relationship, 29%
found no need for assistance.18 4
Table 11(t) reports the cross-tabulations between the overall
nature of the regulator-regulated entity relationship (coercive versus cooperative), and a request for assistance from an elected official. As shown,
only 7% of the respondents provide conflicting indications of the relationship between the regulator and the regulated entity. Yet, of those facilities
that requested assistance, 92% are experiencing a reportedly cooperative
relationship. Of those facilities experiencing a coercive relationship, 86%
found no need for assistance.'
Table 11(u) reports the last cross-tabulation: the tabulation between
a request for assistance from the regulator's supervisor and a request for
assistance from an elected official. As shown, a substantial portion of the
respondents (18%) provide conflicting indications of the relationship
between the regulator and the regulated entity. Of those facilities that
requested assistance from an elected official, 42% did not seek assistance
from the regulator's supervisor. Of those facilities requesting assistance
from the regulator's supervisor, 86% found no need for assistance from an
86
elected official.1
In general, these cross-tabulations provide substantial evidence
that the relationship between a regulator and a regulated entity consists
of multiple dimensions. Therefore, before assessing the effect of this relationship on environmental behavior and/or performance on the part of
regulated entities, future research should comprehensively measure the
various characteristics of the relationship.
CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING COERCIVE AND COOPERATIVE MODELS OF
ENFORCEMENT

Environmental regulations amount to little if regulated entities
do not comply with them. How best to induce those entities to meet their
regulatory responsibilities has for some time been the subject of fierce
debate. On the one hand, some environmental enforcement experts regard
" See tbl.ll(s).
185See

tbl.l1(t).

' See tbl.11(u). Of course, if these two forms of assistance represent substitutes, then only
one form of requested assistance may be expected. In this case, the identified combinations
do not represent conflicting indications of the regulator-regulated entity relationship.
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deterrence as the essential and overriding component of any effective
effort to induce higher rates of compliance by regulated entities." 7 Under
this view, regulated entities respond better to threats directed at their corporate bottom line than to any other factor.' 8 Unless enforcement efforts
engender a perception among regulated entities that it is less costly for
them to comply than it is to resist compliance and risk the imposition of
costly sanctions, these entities will have little incentive to alter their behavior to improve their compliance posture.8 9 Other experts contend that
regulated entities are responsive to a host of factors, including but not
limited to a desire to minimize the cost of environmental regulation.' 90
These factors create an environment in which the provision of compliance
assistance and incentives may be a more effective technique for inducing
compliance than the creation of a strong deterrent based on a rigorous enforcement presence.' 9 ' The proponents of a cooperative approach generally
do not support elimination of deterrence-based enforcement.' 92 Rather,
they regard such enforcement as a last resort which, if used excessively,
can engender resistance by regulated entities that can be counterproductive to the ultimate goal of enhanced compliance. 9 3
To date, few empirical studies have tested the impacts of coercive
and cooperative approaches to enforcement.' 9' The study of facilities in
the chemical industry that are regulated by the CWA described in this
Article represents an effort to begin to address the paucity of information
on the effects of these two different approaches to enforcement on environmental behavior or compliance. Our study indicates that the vast majority
of respondents describe their relationships with CWA regulators as cooperative rather than adversarial or coercive. The responses to additional
questions reveal, however, that in some respects, those who report that
they generally have cooperative relationships also report that particular
aspects of their relationships are more consistent with a coercive than a
cooperative relationship. The converse is also true; those who report that
they have coercive relationships nevertheless describe some aspects of
their relationships with regulators in a manner that reflects cooperation.
187 See supra Part I.A.1.

" See supra Part I.A.1.
89 See supra Part I.A.1.
See supra Part I.A.2.
See supra Part I.A.2.
192 See supra Part I.A.2.
193 See supra Part I.A.2.
" See supra Part I.B.
'
191
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In coming to these results, our study cross-tabulated the responses
to all possible pairs of questions. In general, these cross-tabulations reveal
incomplete overlap between the various measures capturing the relationship between the regulator and the regulated entity. We also calculated
and interpreted the correlations between all possible pairs of responses.
Similar to the cross-tabulations, these statistics reveal only weak correlation between the various measures capturing the relationship between
the regulator and the regulated entity. Overall, the analysis demonstrates
that the relationship between a regulator and a regulated entity consists
of multiple dimensions; no single underlying factor determines all aspects
of the regulator-regulated entity relationship.
The implications of these results for the debate over the comparative effectiveness of the coercive and cooperative approaches to enforcement are significant. They demonstrate that empirical studies assessing
the effectiveness of the two approaches on environmental behavior or performance should avoid characterizing the relationship between regulators
and regulated entities as either distinctively coercive or cooperative. Those
relationships tend, instead, to be multifaceted, with different aspects of
the relationship between regulator and regulated entity conforming to one
or the other of the two enforcement approaches. Our study provides one
starting point for delineating the various components of the regulatorregulated entity relationship. Scholars who design future empirical studies
on environmental enforcement and compliance, and environmental policymakers who assess the results of such studies, would do well to recognize
the nuanced nature of the relationship between regulators and regulated
entities if they are to provide the most meaningful contributions to the
ongoing debate over the impacts of coercive and cooperative enforcement
approaches on the behavior and performance of regulated entities.
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TABLE 1
GENERAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REGULATOR AND
REGULATED ENTITY (N=260)
Category

Frequency

Generally Coercive
Generally Cooperative
Don't Know

%
7

2.7

250

96.2

3

1.1

TABLE 2
TREATMENT OF REGULATED ENTITY BY REGULATOR (N=261)
Category

Frequency

Always Fair

%
209

80.1

49

18.8

Always Unfair or Arbitrary

0

0

Don't Know

3

1.1

Sometimes Fair, Sometimes Unfair

TABLE 3
TYPICAL REGULATOR: STATE VS. FEDERAL (N=259)
Category
State

Frequency

%

250

96.5

Federal

3

1.1

Don't Know

6

2.3
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TABLE 4
TYPE OF INTERACTION WITH REGULATOR:
SAME INDIVIDUAL REGULATOR VS. MULTIPLE REGULATORS (N=260)
Category

%

Frequency

Same Individual Regulator

147

56.5

Multiple Regulators

109

41.9

4

1.5

Don't Know

TABLE 5
REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE FROM
SUPERVISOR OF FACILITY'S REGULATOR (N=258)
Category
No

Frequency

%

206

79.8

49

19.0

3

1.2

Yes
Don't Know

TABLE 6
REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE FROM AN ELECTED OFFICIAL (N=260)
Category

Frequency

%

No

245

94.2

Yes

12

4.6

3

1.2

Don't Know
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TABLE 7
LIKELIHOOD OF ALLOWING REGULATORS ACCESS TO
PLANT FACILITIES WITHOUT ANNOUNCEMENT (N=260)

Category

%

Frequency
234

90.0

7

2.7

17

6.5

Not at All Likely

0

0

Don't Know

2

0.8

Always Likely
Somewhat Likely
Likely

TABLE 8
ATrITUDE OF INDIVIDUAL RESPONDING FOR FACILITY REGARDING
GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSIBLITY TO IMPOSE ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS (N=259)
Category

%

Frequency

Definitely Should Be

148

57.1

Probably Should Be

92

35.5

Probably Should Not Be

9

3.5

Definitely Should Not Be

7

2.7

Don't Know

3

1.2
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TABLE 9
ASSESSMENT BY INDIVIDUAL RESPONDING FOR FACILITY
OF WHETHER COMPANIES BEHAVE RESPONSIBLY EVEN

WITHOUT REGULATION (N=259)
Category

Frequency

%

Strongly agree

30

11.6

Agree

75

29.0

Neither Agree Nor Disagree

25

9.7

Disagree

98

37.8

Strongly Disagree

29

11.2

2

1.0

Don't Know
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TABLE 10
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL MEASURES
195
OF THE REGULATOR-REGULATED ENTITY RELATIONSHIP
Measure

-1

-2

-3

-4

-5

-6

Likelihood of
Allowing Regulators Access to

Plant without
Announcement:
Always Likely
vs. Not Likely

Typical Type of
Regulator: State
vs. Federal

0.089
(0.162)

Type of Interaction with Regulator: Same Individual vs. Mult-

0.021
(0.745)

0.106
(0.096)

Treatment of
Regulated Entity
by Regulator:
Always Fair vs.
Not Always Fair

- 0.055
(0.382)

0.070
(0.267)

0.224
(0.000)

Overall Nature
of the Relationship: Coercive
vs. Cooperative

- 0.054
(0.388)

- 0.015
(0.811)

0.099
(0.115)

0.345
(0.000)

Requested Assistance from Regulator's Supervisor: Yes vs. No

0.015
(0.808)

- 0.054
(0.394)

0.059
(0.350)

0.222
(0.000)

0.2222
(0.000)

Requested
Assistance from
Elected Official:
Yes vs. No

0.055
(0.383)

- 0.024
(0.709)

0.033
(0.602)

0.080
(0.205)

0.076
(0.227)

iple Regulators

195

P-values are shown in parentheses.

0.221
(0.000)

650

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L.

& POL'Y REV.

[Vol. 31:603

TABLE 11
CROSS-TABULATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL MEASURES OF THE REGULATORREGULATED ENTITY RELATIONSHIP

TABLE 11(a)
LIKELIHOOD OF ALLOWING REGULATORS ACCESS TO PLANT
FACILITIES WITHOUT ANNOUNCEMENT AND TYPICAL TYPE OF
REGULATOR (STATE VS. FEDERAL) (N=250)
Coercive: Federal

Cooperative: State

Coercive: Not Always
Likely to Allow Access

1
(0.40 %)

23
(9.20 %)

Cooperative: Always
Likely to Allow Access

2
(0.80 %)

224
(89.60 %)

TABLE 11(b)
LIKELIHOOD OF ALLOWING REGULATORS ACCESS TO PLANT
FACILITIES WITHOUT ANNOUNCEMENT AND TYPE OF INTERACTION
WITH REGULATOR (SAME INDIVIDUAL VS. MULTIPLE REGULATORS) (N=253)
Coercive:
Same Individual
Coercive: Not Always Likely
to Allow Access
Cooperative: Always
Likely to Allow Access

Cooperative:
Multiple Regulators

11
(4.35 %)

13
(5.14 %)

97
(38.34 %)

132
(52.17 %)
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TABLE 11(c)
LIKELIHOOD OF ALLOWING REGULATORS ACCESS TO PLANT
FACILITIES WITHOUT ANNOUNCEMENT AND TREATMENT OF
THE REGULATED ENTITY BY ITS REGULATOR (N=253)
Coercive:
Not Always Fair
Treatment

Cooperative:
Always Fair
Treatment

Coercive: Not Always
Likely to Allow Access

3
(1.18 %)

21
(8.24 %)

Cooperative: Always
Likely to Allow Access

46
(18.04 %)

185
(72.55 %)

TABLE 11(d)
LIKELIHOOD OF ALLOWING REGULATORS ACCESS TO
PLANT FACILITIES WITHOUT ANNOUNCEMENT AND
OVERALL RELATIONSHIP (COERCIVE VS. COOPERATIVE) (N=254)
Coercive:
Overall Coercive

Cooperative:
Overall Cooperative

Coercive: Not Always
Likely to Allow Access

0
(0.00 %)

24
(9.45 %)

Cooperative: Always
Likely to Allow Access

7
(2.76 %)

223
(87.80 %)
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TABLE 11(e)
LIKELIHOOD OF ALLOWING REGULATORS ACCESS TO PLANT
FACILITIES WITHOUT ANNOUNCEMENT AND REQUEST FOR
ASSISTANCE FROM THE REGULATOR'S SUPERVISOR (N=253)
Coercive:
Assistance

Cooperative:
No Assistance

Coercive: Not Always
Likely to Allow Access

5
(1.98 %)

19
(7.51%)

Cooperative: Always
Likely to Allow Access

43
(17.00 %)

186
(73.52 %)

TABLE 11(f)
LIKELIHOOD OF ALLOWING REGULATORS ACCESS TO
PLANT FACILITIES WITHOUT ANNOUNCEMENT AND
REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE FROM AN ELECTED OFFICIAL (N=254)
Coercive:
Assistance

Cooperative:
No Assistance

Coercive: Not Always
Likely to Allow Access

2
(0.79 %)

22
(8.66 %)

Cooperative: Always
Likely to Allow Access

10
(3.94 %)

220
(86.61%)
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TABLE 11(g)
TYPICAL TYPE OF REGULATOR (STATE VS. FEDERAL)
AND TYPE OF INTERACTION WITH REGULATOR
(SAME INDIDUAL VS. MULTIPLE REGULATORS) (N=250)
Coercive:
Same Individual
Coercive: Typically
State Regulator
Cooperative: Typically
Federal Regulator

Cooperative:
Multiple Regulators

2
(0.80 %)

0
(0.00 %)

103
(41.20 %)

145
(58.00 %)

TABLE 11(h)
TYPICAL TYPE OF REGULATOR (STATE VS. FEDERAL) AND
TREATMENT OF THE REGULATED ENTITY BY ITS REGULATOR (N=251)
Coercive:
Not Always Fair
Treatment
Coercive: Typically
State Regulator
Cooperative: Typically
Federal Regulator

Cooperative:
Always Fair
Treatment

1
(0.40 %)

1
(0.40 %)

47
(18.73 %)

202
(80.48 %)
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TABLE 11(i)

TYPICAL TYPE OF REGULATOR (STATE VS. FEDERAL) AND OVERALL
NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP (COERCIVE VS. COOPERATIVE) (N=250)
Coercive:
Overall Coercive

Cooperative:
Overall
Cooperative

Coercive: Typically
State Regulator

0
(0.00 %)

2
(0.80 %)

Cooperative: Typically
Federal Regulator

7
(2.80 %)

241
(96.40 %)

TABLE 11(j)
TYPICAL TYPE OF REGULATOR (STATE VS. FEDERAL) AND REQUEST
FOR ASSISTANCE FROM THE REGULATOR'S SUPERVISOR (N=247)
Coercive:
Assistance
Coercive: Typically
State Regulator
Cooperative: Typically
Federal Regulator

Cooperative:
No Assistance

0
(0.00 %)

3
(1.21%)

48
(19.43 %)

196
(79.35 %)
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TABLE 11(k)

TYPICAL TYPE OF REGULATOR (STATE VS. FEDERAL) AND
REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE FROM AN ELECTED OFFICIAL (N=249)
Coercive:
Assistance

Cooperative:
No Assistance

Coercive: Typically
State Regulator

0
(0.00 %)

3
(1.20 %)

Cooperative: Typically
Federal Regulator

11
(4.42 %)

235
(94.38 %)

Table 11(1)
TYPE OF INTERACTION WITH REGULATOR (SAME
INDIVIDUAL VS. MULTIPLE REGULATORS) AND TREATMENT
OF THE REGULATED ENTITY BY ITS REGULATOR (N=256)
Coercive:
Not Always Fair
Treatment

Cooperative:
Always Fair
Treatment

Coercive: Same
Individual Regulator

32
(12.50 %)

77
(30.08 %)

Cooperative: Multiple
Individual Regulators

17
(6.64 %)

130
(50.78 %)
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TABLE 11(m)
TYPE OF INTERACTION WITH REGULATOR (SAME INDIVIDUAL
VS. MULTIPLE REGULATORS) AND OVERALL NATURE OF THE
RELATIONSHIP (COERCIVE VS. COOPERATIVE) (N=255)
Coercive:
Overall Coercive

Cooperative:
Overall
Cooperative

Coercive: Same
Individual Regulator

5
(1.96 %)

103
(40.39 %)

Cooperative: Multiple
Individual Regulators

2
(0.78 %)

145
(56.86 %)

TABLE 11(n)
TYPE OF INTERACTION WITH REGULATOR (SAME INDIVIDUAL
VS. MULTIPLE REGULATORS) AND REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE
FROM THE REGULATOR'S SUPERVISOR (N=251)
Coercive:
Assistance

Cooperative:
No Assistance

Coercive: Same
Individual Regulator

24
(9.56 %)

84
(33.47 %)

Cooperative: Multiple
Individual Regulators

25
(9.96 %)

118
(47.01%)

20071

657

THE REGULATOR-REGULATED ENTITY RELATIONSHIP

TABLE 11(o)
TYPE OF INTERACTION WITH REGULATOR (SAME INDIVIDUAL
VS. MULTIPLE REGULATORS) AND REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE
FROM AN ELECTED OFFICIAL (N=253)
Coercive:
Assistance

Cooperative:
No Assistance

Coercive: Same
Individual Regulator

6
(2.37 %)

102
(40.32 %)

Cooperative: Multiple
Individual Regulators

6
(2.37 %)

139
(54.94 %)

TABLE 11(p)
TREATMENT OF THE REGULATED ENTITY BY ITS REGULATOR AND OVERALL
NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP (COERCIVE VS. COOPERATIVE) (N=257)
Coercive:
Overall Coercive

Cooperative:
Overall
Cooperative

Coercive: Not
Always Fair Treatment

7
(2.72 %)

42
(16.34 %)

Cooperative:
Always Fair Treatment

0
(0.00 %)

208
(80.93 %)
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TABLE 11(q)
TREATMENT OF THE REGULATED ENTITY BY ITS REGULATOR AND
REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE FROM THE REGULATOR'S SUPERVISOR (N=253)
Coercive:
Assistance

Cooperative:
No Assistance

Coercive: Not
Always Fair Treatment

18
(7.11%)

30
(11.86 %)

Cooperative:
Always Fair Treatment

31
(12.25 %)

174
(68.77 %)

TABLE 11(r)
TREATMENT OF THE REGULATED ENTITY BY ITS REGULATOR
AND REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE FROM AN ELECTED OFFICIAL (N=255)
Coercive: Assistance

Cooperative: No
Assistance

Coercive: Not
Always Fair Treatment

4
(1.57 %)

45
(17.65 %)

Cooperative:
Always Fair Treatment

8
(3.14 %)

198
(77.65 %)
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TABLE ll(s)
OVERALL NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP (COERCIVE VS.
COOPERATIVE) AND REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE FROM THE
REGULATOR'S SUPERVISOR (N=253)

Coercive:
Assistance
Coercive:
Overall Coercive
Cooperative:
Overall Cooperative

Cooperative:
No Assistance

5
(1.98 %)

2
(0.79 %)

44
(17.39 %)

202
(79.84 %)

TABLE 11(t)
OVERALL NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP (COERCIVE VS. COOPERATIVE)
AND REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE FROM AN ELECTED OFFICIAL (N=255)
Coercive:
Assistance

Cooperative:
No Assistance

Coercive:
Overall Coercive

1
(0.39 %)

6
(2.35 %)

Cooperative:
Overall Cooperative

11
(4.31%)

237
(92.94 %)
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TABLE 11(u)
REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE FROM THE REGULATOR'S SUPERVISOR
AND REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE FROM AN ELECTED OFFICIAL (N=255)
Coercive:
Assistance from
Elected Official

Cooperative:
No Assistance from
Elected Official

Coercive:
Requested Assistance from
Regulator's Supervisor

7
(2.75 %)

42
(16.47 %)

Cooperative:
No Requested Assistance

5
(1.96 %)

201
(78.82 %)

from Regulator's Supervisor

